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Critical Components of Current U.S. Foreign Policy

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Senate

VIETNAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have read with great interest the speech by the distingushed Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER], and I also listened to what he had to say and the colloquy which ensued subsequent to his deliverance of the speech.

I commend the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] for showing his usual calmness, good judgment, restraint, and wisdom in what he has to say, and to assure him that he has a great deal of company in what he has said.

When it comes to worrying about the situation in Vietnam, it is the shadow which affects all our lives, and it is preeminent to the consideration of any other question.

When I think of how much Vietnam is costing us in men and money, it makes me sad indeed to consider the tragedy which is the lot of this country in that far distant land.

We became involved in Vietnam because of mistakes, because of miscalculations, because of misunderstandings, and because of good intentions.

As was pointed out in the Senate this afternoon by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG], it is too late to question how or why we got into Vietnam. The question is moot. It belongs to history. There is no question, as far as any Member of the Senate is concerned that I know of, of withdrawing from Vietnam at this time. But I do think the overriding question, if not the only question, in the mind of every Senator, regardless of his position on this subject, whether he is labeled a dove or a hawk, or has no label, is to find a way to the negotiating table, to the ways in which an honorable truce, or an honorable peace or an honorable settlement, can be achieved.

It was brought out that perhaps the bombing should be suspended, and that this would pave the way to negotiations. Frankly, I would like to advocate a suspension of the bombing, because I have never advocated the bombing itself; but I feel, if we were to suspend the bombing and there were no reaction on the part of North Vietnam, the reaction on our part, both government and people, would be far more bitter and far more dangerous than is the situation at the present time.

Perhaps the distinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] has given us a way out by means of which bombing would be confined to interdiction of supply routes and would increase at the 17th parallel and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It is certainly a proposal worthy of consideration.

As far as the membership of this body is concerned, I wish to state that I believe in the right of dissent. No matter how a Senator is labeled, he does have a right to dissent and the right to express his opinions as he sees fit, but always, I would hope, constructively.

I would not consider even those who say, "Go in all the way," or who want to turn North Vietnam back into the Stone

Vietnam and the United Nations - Johns Hopkins, Nov. 10, 1966
Central Concerns of American Foreign Policy - North Carolina, March 13, 1967
Critical Components of Current U.S. Foreign Policy - Cleveland, April 30, 1967
Face the Nation - CBS, News, May 7, 1967

Age, as unpatriotic. I disagree with their judgment; I think they are wrong. Just how much would it be necessary to bomb North Vietnam back into the Stone Age, because just how far is their economy out of the Stone Age?

I also believe in the right of demonstrations, because that is guaranteed under the Constitution, and it is a right which should be honored—not the right to burn one's draft card; not the right to insult the President of the United States; or the Secretary of State; or a Senator; or the Ambassador to the U.N.; not the right to burn the U.S. flag. In Montana we have penalties for that. The penalty is a $5,000 fine or 3 years in jail, or both. These actions represent licenses, in my opinion, not the exercise of free speech, not the exercise of the right to dissent, not the right to make one's demands known.

The tendencies toward open-ended conflict are becoming more and more recognizable, whereas the alternatives toward a reasonable negotiation in seeking to bring about an honorable conclusion are becoming fewer and fewer all the time.

I would say that the weight of the responsibility of Vietnam is heavy on the shoulders of every Senator, but heaviest on the shoulders of the President.

If we remain silent, future generations will judge us as weaklings, as vacillators, and as cowards. It is to them, and to the generation now fighting in Vietnam, that we owe our chief responsibilities, because those who are over there are not there of their own free will. They are carrying out policy laid down here in Washington.

I would hope that those of us who think of Vietnam as something which will disappear will, as the distinguished senior Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] stated this afternoon, look at the reality and recognize the situation which confronts us. If it means increasing the 500,000 mark in manpower in Vietnam—as I think it will—the country ought to know about it. If it means an increase in taxes—and I assume it will—the country ought to know about it. If it means calling up the Reserves and the National Guard, the country ought to know about it; it means the imposition of wage and price controls, the country ought to know about it. I say that because the way we have been going cannot last, and one day, if it continues, we will face a confrontation, and it may be too late to do the things then that we should be doing now.

One of the ways which was mentioned by the distinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] this afternoon was through the United Nations. I join with him in the statement that the principal fixation in the world today is Vietnam—in the world. The conflict is discussed from every conceivable angle in living rooms, offices, classrooms, and diplomatic circles around the world. There may well be, in fact, a surfeit of talk but very little in the way of productive action in getting a confrontation of the belligerents at a conference table.

One place where this vacuum is especially evident is at the United Nations. The charter—a treaty obligation on all member states—does assign to the U.N. responsibilities in meeting threats to peace. They are not unilateral U.N. responsibilities. They are not sole or exclusive U.N. responsibilities. But they are authentic U.N. responsibilities which are shared by all member states. These responsibilities have not been faced. Apart from the individual efforts of Secretary General U Thant, suggestions by U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg that the Security Council take up the matter, and scattered proposals by other member nations, the U.N. has been silent on Vietnam. As an organization, it has been silent and, in my judgment, it has been silent for too long. To date, the U.N. has not even taken formal notice of the conflict in Vietnam as a threat to peace even though the distinguished Secretary General has expressed the fear that unless it is soon terminated, it may lead to another world war.

Mr. President, I do not pretend to grasp the full circumstances of this abdication of organizational responsibility by the U.N. during these months and years. It does seem to me, however, that whatever the reasons in the past, the time is now long past due for the United Nations—as an organization—to attempt to make some contribution to ending the conflict. It should make that attempt by open procedure and not merely through the diplomacy of its distinguished Secretary General and the corridor diplomacy of various representatives at the U.N. The Security Council, where the matter of Vietnam can be and should be considered, contains among its members those nations who have a decided relevance in seeking to alter the present course of events in Vietnam. It contains Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the Co-chairmen of the Geneva Conferences. It contains France, whose experience in Indochinese affairs is great and whose deep and sympathetic interest in the people of the region is beyond question. It contains Canada, which, as a member of the International Control Commission, is involved in continuous observations of developments in Vietnam. It contains Japan, which feels every day more strongly the gathering turbulence of this war in Asia. It contains the United States, a major combatant in the war in Vietnam.

The Security Council also has the necessary precedents from the Korean war which would serve to bring into the situation the other combatants or potential combatants, who are not members of the U.N. Let me make it clear that I mean by this reference Communist China, North Vietnam and any other government or group whose presence may be relevant to the restoration of peace in South Vietnam—and in that category I include the NLF. Let me also make clear that I do not view the U.N. at this point as a source of ultimate solution of the Vietnamese problem. Rather, I see it as a possible initiator of a face-to-face public confrontation of the conflicting views of the most relevant parties.

The need for such a confrontation is more and more urgent. An open and frank discussion can help to pinpoint the roadblocks to an honorable and equitable negotiated solution before the expansion of the war shuts off even the slim possibilities for such a solution. Every combatant may gain from a confrontation of this kind if it opens up direct communications. Who stands to lose from it?

The distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] has long advocated recourse to the machinery of the U.N. as a way of stopping the war in Vietnam. Without prejudging the organization's role in that respect, I have for some months urged its use, at least as a vehicle for an open discussion of the conflict to which all belligerents would be invited by U.N. Security Council resolution. This is the first time that I have urged this approach in a discussion on the floor of the Senate. I do so because of my sense of deep concern that the clock is running out in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

An elaboration of my thoughts on this question, Mr. President, is contained in addresses which I made last fall at Johns Hopkins University, and this year at the University of North Carolina and at the Temple in Cleveland, Ohio.

I ask unanimous consent that, at the conclusion of my remarks, those statements be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibits 1, 2, and 3.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. I also ask unanimous consent that the transcript of the May 7 CBS radio broadcast of "Face the Nation," featuring U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 4.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to say one further word. I have indicated that I believe in criticism from all sides, provided it is constructive. I do not believe that differences of viewpoint should be stifled. But I do believe that discussions should be responsible, in and out of the Senate. Differences of viewpoint, responsibly arrived at and responsibly expressed, in my judgment, are essential to a solution in Vietnam. Restrained and thoughtful debate on policy is not a luxury; it is a necessity.

Insofar as President Johnson is concerned, he is open to any suggestion which may emerge from discussion and debate, and which may hold some promise of peace. He knows as do we that the crucial question is not how this war began, but how it can be ended at the earliest possible moment and in an honorable manner.

An honorable ending is not going to be brought about by simplistic formulas such as "Get all the way in or get all the way out." An honorable ending is not going to be brought about by the spread of military violence, with its attendant tragedy for all Vietnamese, north and south, for ourselves, and for all concerned.

Mr. President, President Johnson's concern with this tragedy is as deep as yours or mine—deeper, perhaps, because he has to live with it 24 hours a day. The ultimate responsibility is his; and for him, there is no surcease. So I would hope, Mr. President, when we consider

there is ever present the possibility of its eruption into a war of regional, continental or world-wide dimensions.

The conflict in Viet Nam may end, of course, long before it matriculates into war with China or universal nuclear catastrophe. That is certainly the rational hope. Whether or not it is an attainable hope is another mater. In any event, the Vietnamese conflict now, today, already has the capacity to shake the precarious base of civilized human survival. That will continue to be the case until the war begins to yield to rational settlement.

Whatever else it is, therefore, the war in Viet Nam is a most urgent warning to all nations. It flashes a danger signal with respect to the adequacy of the present international instruments of peace. These instruments have not only failed to prevent a breakdown of peace in Viet Nam; they also appear incapable of restoring peace in any prompt and generally acceptable fashion.

It is high time, therefore, to note with emphasis that the structure of international order which has evolved during the past twenty years is, to say the least, dangerously haphazard. As it is now, each state has its own formula for safeguarding the security of its people. Each state tends to blend into that formula, in various combinations, a supply of unilateral military power and a participation in a variety of bilateral and regional defense arrangements. Each nation adds to this mixture its own version of traditional diplomacy and modern variations thereon. Almost all nations complete the blend with a dash of the United Nations.

Of late, the role of the United Nations has become less and less pronounced. Indeed, with respect to Viet Nam the U. N. presence is scarcely discernible. It is true that the distinguished Secretary-General, U Thant, has taken public note of the conflict in Viet Nam and its dangers to the world. The Secretary-General is a man of peace and an exceptional diplomat. He has made clear that he is more than willing to place his dedication and his skills at the disposal of the disputants in Viet Nam. In his diplomatic role, he has outlined views which might provide at some points a basis for a settlement of the conflict and he has, otherwise, sought tactfully to engage the interest of various parties in a settlement.

With all due respect, however, the sincere efforts of the Secretary-General are hardly to be equated with bringing to bear on this situation the potentials of the United Nations. Viet Nam is, clearly, a breakdown in the peace within the meaning of the Charter. It contains, clearly, the threat of an expanding war. With these characteristics, it would appear that the conflict should long since have triggered the utilization of every resource of the United Nations in an effort to restore peace. Yet, I regret to say, that apart from the personal efforts of the Secretary-General, the U. N. reaction to Viet Nam has had something of the character of that of a disinterested, enervated or impotent onlooker. It is almost as though the conflict in Viet Nam were taking place not on the other side of this planet but rather on some other planet entirely.

It may be, of course, that the U. N. is unable to make a contribution to peace in Viet Nam. It may also be, however, that the failure to seek a contribution from the U. N. is a missing link in the restoration of peace in Viet Nam.

Whatever may be involved, the non-role of the United Nations in this situation ought not to go unnoticed. An embarrassed silence is no longer a sufficient response to the nation's needs or to the world's needs. Urgent though it is, there is more involved in these needs even than ending the war in Viet Nam. There is also at stake the prevention of a more monstrous conflict. There is also at stake the continued credibility and utility of what has heretofore been a fundamental instrument in the structure of world order.

In my judgment, it is high time to face up to the conspicuous absence of the U.N. from the Vietnamese dispute. We need to ask why, when the need for a peace-effort is maximal, the output of the U.N. is minimal. And we need, at the same time, to explore every possibility for the engagement of the organization in the effort to bring about a termination of the hostilities in Viet Nam.

The U.N. was an essential element, among others, in the Korean cease-fire. Why, then, its inconsequence in the problem of Viet Nam? In this connection, it is manifest that there have been striking changes in the structure of the U.N. since the Korean conflict. Whatever their virtues, it may be that these changes inhibit the engagement of the organization in Viet Nam.

The most sweeping change, of course, is that the U.N. has become a General Assembly-oriented organization at the same time, that the membership has grown to over 120 states. It will be recalled that originally there were 51 united nations. Among the present members, there are, as there have been since the outset, states-infinitesimal and states-immense and, in between, all of the gradations.

There are enormous differences of significance among these states insofar as the practical problems of maintaining peace are concerned. Yet, all 120 have equal access to available time in the General Assembly. All 120 have an equal share in the control of the purse. All 120 have an equal vote in decisions of the Assembly.

It is hardly an overstatement to note that the structure of the General Assembly is appallingly cumbersome. Nevertheless, the Assembly has made and it can continue to make important contributions of a long-range and peripheral nature to the strengthening of world peace. With all due respect, however, there is doubt that a body constituted as the General Assembly now is can play a significant—an executive—role in dealing with imminent threats of war or in the re-establishment of a peace that has broken down. In my judgment, the General Assembly is not competent for that purpose. In my judgment, it is delusive at this time, to expect it to discharge functions of a kind which might be helpful in Viet Nam.

It is conceivable that alterations in the structure of the General Assembly might remedy its inadequacies for peace-keeping or peace-restoring purposes. Francis Plimpton, a former U.S. representative to the U.N. was right, perhaps, when he suggested that the organization was in need of "family planning." It might be that the use of a single spokesman for groups of small states would be helpful. It might be, too, that the clustering of smaller states into one vote on some power-projected formula would be helpful in insuring fiscal responsibility and a measure of realism in the significant political decisions of that body. I have no doubt that there are any number of technical changes which, given sufficient time, can be absorbed to great advantage into the structure of the General Assembly.

But in all frankness, I must say that insofar as Viet Nam is concerned, there is not a sufficient margin of time. Moreover, it is not at all certain that the kind of wholesale reconstitution of the General Assembly which would give it a peace-keeping function in Viet Nam and similar situations is either practical or desirable. As I have already noted, the General Assembly has other useful, long-range and peripheral functions of peace. Its value for those purposes should not be jeopardized by projecting it into situations for which it was not designed and for which it would have to be severely reshaped if it is to be effective.

It seems to me practical, therefore, to look elsewhere in the U.N. structure for a significant contribution to the restoration of peace in Viet Nam. The Charter clearly indicates that, veto or not, we should look first to the Security Council. It may be valid to assume that the Security Council is less useful as an instrument of peace-keeping when permanent powers are in disagreement. But it is not at all valid to assume that the Security Council is useless in those circumstances. That the Security Council may not be able to play the central role in questions of peace does not rule out its playing of any role.

Whaever differences may separate them with respect to Viet Nam, the permanent powers of the Security Council, I believe, have all expressed their grave concern with the situation and the urgent need to do something about it. That is an entirely adequate basis, it seems to me, on which to turn to the Council and seek from it a contribution to the restoration of peace in Viet Nam.

Let me make clear that miracles are not to be expected. All that can reasonably be asked is a wholehearted effort to do what can be done to further peace. The least that should be expected, or accepted, it seems to me, is a willingness on the part of the Council to confront the issue of Viet Nam and to confront it soon.

One cannot foresee, of course, what can be most helpfully done by the U.N. What ought to be clear at this point, however, is that doing nothing in the U.N. has not helped in Viet Nam. There are discernible lines of possible U.N. contribution which, it would seem, warrant the fullest exploration.

One of these lines, for example, leads from the Security Council to the International Court. All of the combatants in Viet Nam have affirmed, I believe, the fundamental relevance of the Geneva Accords of 1954 as the basis for settlement of the conflict. Certainly, the United States has done so.

We need to know, authoritatively and impartially, what the requirements may be in current circumstances for the reassertion of the Geneva Accords as a legal basis for a restoration of peace. We need to know, too, what must be done sooner or later by all the parties directly or indirectly involved in the Vietnamese conflict to comply with the Geneva Accords and so establish conditions for a just and acceptable peace. In the circumstances, therefore, it might be useful for the Security Council to ask an advisory opinion of the International Court on these questions.

It would seem to me, too, that the Security Council is an appropriate setting for a cards on-the-table consideration of the present positions of all the participants—direct or indirect—and those deeply interested in the conflict in Viet Nam. Certain of the states such as the United States, the Soviet Union and France are present as permanent members of the Council. The problem of participation of the others is not insurmountable in the light of the experiences in the Korean case. In that instance, it will be recalled, an invitation was issued to Peking—a non-member of the U.N.—to come to the Security Council and Peking did present its case and participate briefly in its discussions.

If a consideration of the question of Viet Nam before the Security Council is to have maximum utility, there needs to be present not only the Soviet Union, France, the United States and other Security Council members but also China and North Viet Nam and the National Liberation Front, as well as Saigon. In a confrontation of this kind, we may begin, at last, to understand whether it is distrust, disinclination, disdain, density, or whatever which has so far stood in the way of negotiations for an honorable settlement. We may begin, at last, to measure rather than guess the gap which must be bridged in the restoration of peace in Viet Nam.

To be sure, the prospects of a refusal of the invitation are obvious. To be sure, the

these proposals, that we do not expect miracles, that we keep our heads, and that we do not indulge in personalities.

In closing, I emphasize that the responsibility for the conduct of our Nation's foreign affairs is vested in the President of the United States. Whether we agree with him or disagree, whether he pleases or displeases us, will not lighten one iota the onerous burdens which rest on his shoulders as a result of the Vietnam conflict. The President may look for advice to his aides in the executive branch. He may look to the Senate and to the people of this Nation. Whether or not advice is forthcoming, whether or not there is consent to his course, the President still must decide what he believes to be in the best interests of the United States. That is his responsibility. He cannot share it. He can only assume it on behalf of all of us.

In this most perilous hour, Mr. President, I think the President needs and should have our understanding, our help, our prayers, and the support which can be given to him in good conscience. It ought to be borne in mind at all times that whatever contribution this Nation can make to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, that contribution can only be made and will be made on behalf of all of us, in the end, by the President of the United States. So I would hope, Mr. President, that this suggestion, made first at Johns Hopkins, later repeated at the University of North Carolina, and still later at The Temple in Cleveland, a suggestion made originally by the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] and others, that we go to the Security Council, and that we ask the U.N. to face up to its responsibilities, will be taken to heart by the administration, and that some action along these lines will get underway. As I have said before, the hour is growing late. There is not too much time left.

EXHIBIT 1

VIETNAM AND THE UNITED NATIONS

(Address by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, Democrat, of Montana, Johns Hopkins University, the George Huntington Williams Memorial Lecture, Nov. 10, 1966)

I have come here from two weeks of politics in Montana. Elections in my State usually involve a great deal of personal exchange with voters. This year was no exception. Although not running myself, I found the campaign as intensive as Montana is extensive. It carried me into confrontation with many, many Americans over a trail of thousands of miles. I had occasion to speak to Montanans on the range, in the high mountains, along the roads, at ranch and reservation, and in village, town, and city.

Political campaigning is not, as it might appear to be, an exhausting pursuit. On the contrary, at least to the politically sensitized, it is a kind of restorative. It reactivates the ability to differentiate between what is important and what is grossly over-rated in the public affairs of the nation. That essential perspective, may I say, is frequently distorted in the political prisms of Washington.

A campaign may be designed to inform the voter but it also informs the campaigner. It unfolds the deep disquiets as well as the hopes which move in the political substructure of the nation. Each election campaign, in short, is a rediscovery of the human side of American public life.

I meet with you fresh from an exposure to a cross-section of American sentiment as it exists in Montana, where the frost has long been on the pumpkin and the snows of winter have already begun to gather. I meet with you still strongly seized with what lies closest to the heart of the people of my State.

I have found in 25 years of public life that on fundamental matters, there is not much difference between a Montanan outlook and the national outlook. I assume, therefore, that the basic concerns of the people of Montana are your basic concerns, just as basic hopes are also probably similar. In short, I assume that what is most important in Montana is also likely to be most important here.

In that vein, I wish that I might say that the legislative record of the 89th Congress or some specific aspect of it is of fundamental interest to Americans at this time. As you know, the Senate and House dealt with a great range of public problems during the past two years. These problems, having accumulated over a long time, had arisen to challenge not only the stability of the nation's political and social structure but even the adequacy of the nation's physical environment.

In my judgment, a very substantial legislative base has now been laid for meeting these problems. The record of the 89th Congress is, indeed, extraordinary in scope. The cognomen, "Great Congress" may well be apt. In any event, as a participant, I should like to think so.

Yet, in all honesty, I cannot claim that the legislative achievements of these two years are a response to what is most basic in the concerns and hopes of the people of the nation. I regret to say that these achievements, however significant, are obscured in the shadow which Viet Nam has cast over every aspect of the life of the nation.

The preoccupation of Americans remains Viet Nam and its implication. Every day, these implications grow more personal and direct for more youth and their families. The war is clearly the nexus of the national anxiety. And peace lies at the heart of the nation's hopes; peace—its honorable restoration at the earliest possible moment.

I know that you have heard a great deal of Viet Nam over many months. It is a subject from which you might welcome a measure of surcease. By the same token, I would prefer to consider some other less vexing question, perhaps even the outcome of the election. Yet I am impelled to return to this critical matter tonight.

As you may know, problems of foreign relation shave concerned me for many years and, out of that concern, I have frequently addressed myself to the Vietnamese question. My views on the situation there are generally known and I do not intend to repeat them in detail here. Certainly, I have said time and again—in public statements as well as in the private councils of the government—that it does not matter much, at this late date, how we became involved in Viet Nam. The point is that we are involved, deeply involved, and we cannot and we will not withdraw in the absence of an honorable settlement of this question. Nevertheless, I believe (and I have so stated many times) that it would be to the benefit of all concerned if there could be an immediate contraction of the hostilities and, as soon as possible thereafter, their complete termination.

I have long been persuaded that the interests of the United States categorize us as a Pacific power but that those interests most certainly do not commend to us the role of Asian power. As a Pacific power rather than an Asian power (and the two are sometimes confused) it is, in my judgment, wholly in our national interest to remove American military installations and forces from the entire Southeast Asian mainland, as soon as that can be done—as soon as an honorable peace is assured.

May I say that that view accords with the President's proclaimed purpose in Viet Nam which is a settlement achieved by negotiations. At Manila, moreover, the pledge was made that there would be a withdrawal of American forces from Viet Nam within six months after a basis for peace is established. He has alluded, also, time and again, to the willingness of the United States to remove American bases not only from Viet Nam but from all of the Southeast Asian mainland.

This policy has not only been enunciated by the President; it has been reiterated by his subordinates. His Ambassador at the United Nations, for example, gave the President's policy its most comprehensive expression in the flexible proposals for a Vietnamese peace which he made at the opening of the current session of the General Assembly.

It has to be faced, however, that for all the words of peace, there is not only an absence of peace but no visible prospect for its restoration in the near future. Those with whom we are locked in this deadly struggle are either not persuaded of the honesty of our purpose in seeking the negotiation of an honorable peace or they are not interested in an honorable peace or they define an honorable peace in concepts so different from our own that, at this point, there is no basis for a reconciliation of positions.

May I add quickly that I assume that some such considerations are involved, because there are no certainties as to why proffers of negotiations have been rejected out of hand. The fact is that in the absence of a confrontation between all the participants—the direct and indirect participants—in this conflict, we cannot understand precisely the reasons for the reluctance to open negotiations. Nor can we define the dimensions of the gap which must be bridged before peace can be re-established.

At this time, only one point is clear. Despite the President's obvious willingness to confer or to negotiate, we have found no such willingness on the part of North Viet Nam, the Southern National Liberation Front, China, or the Soviet Union. We have been unable to enter into an exchange with any participants direct or indirect in the Vietnamese war—except those already in substantial sympathy or agreement with us.

And so, the echo of the words of peace is the continued din of war. The conflict in Viet Nam has not only failed to contract; it has steadily expanded. The process has been relentless. All the while, the options have shrunk; the alternatives have grown fewer.

It is not yet clear what it will take to produce a flicker in the lamp of peace, much less what will be required to end the war. Until the conflict is ended, however, it cannot be dismissed from our awareness. It cannot be brushed aside in favor of more pleasant or tractable subjects. It cannot be relegated by indifference to the inconsequential.

Viet Nam is, as I have stated, at the core of the concerns and hopes of the people of the nation. It involves, in a very pertinent sense, the well-being of every living American and the future of the United States. It is interlaced with the interests of this nation in Asia and the Pacific and throughout the world.

The was is already a hideous human tragedy for all concerned. It has destroyed tens of thousands of lives and has put to the torch of utter devastation an incalculable quantity of useful resources. It has already swept away many of man's most constructive works in Viet Nam, north and south. It has brought this nation about 40,000 casualties to date. It has required rising expenditures of public funds, and their diversion from productive works. In fact, the current costs of the Vietnamese war are variously estimated as running between one and two billion dollars a month.

Even more disturbing, the seeds of a much larger tragedy are obviously implanted in the Vietnamese situation. That the conflict can be confined to Viet Nam is far from assured. Actually, it already extends into Laos and

prospects of a high decible of propaganda and invective, if the invitations are accepted, are equally obvious. But these are risks which can readily be sustained when the stakes for all concerned are as high as they are in Viet Nam. Insofar as the United States is concerned, it is in the interest of this nation to welcome the confrontation. The open bar of world opinion is one before which we must never hesitate or fear to place this nation's policies.

The courses which I have indicated are illustrative of the possibilities of using the untapped resources of the United Nations to advance towards peace in Viet Nam. They may or may not be relevant at this time. A vigorous effort on the part of the U.N. may prove as futile as all other efforts to date, military and non-military, to terminate the conflict. But with the world enmshed in the most dangerous international situation since Korea, we must seek by every avenue to facilitate the restoration of a just peace in Viet Nam. We owe that to the unfortunate people of that nation, to ourselves and to the world.

EXHIBIT 2

CENTRAL CONCERNS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

(Address by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, Democrat, of Montana, before the Carolina Forum, the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., Mar. 13, 1967)

Prior to my coming to Congress a quarter of a century ago, I thought my stock of solutions to the questions of foreign policy was quite adequate. In fact, as a teacher of history at the University of Montana, which I was, I had a touch of what Senator Fulbright might call the arrogance of brain power. In more common idiom, there were time when I thought I knew it all. That may I say, is a failing common to exceptional historians, from Herodotus to Schlesinger.

As a new Member of Congress, my background in history was highly useful. I also discovered, however, that my knowledge of international affairs did not go very far. It did not begin to provide much of an understanding, let alone answers, to the critical issues which were emerging as World War II drew to a close. In those days, most of us in government suffered from serious imperfections in our notions of the outside world and widely-held but unfounded hopes for an automatic postwar peace under the United Nations.

We took many wrong tacks along with the right ones in the course of our foreign policy. For many decades to come, historians will be engaged in sorting out the one from the other. We made mistakes in Asia. We made them in Europe. We made them in the United Nations. We made them over the whole range of emerging new international issues.

I, for one, felt my limitations and recognized the need to become a student again. My classroom was Congress, in Committee and on the floor. My extracurricular activity included a great deal of foreign travel, extensive reading and not a little reflection.

To this day, a student I have remained; an expert I am not; and teaching is the profession to which, at some point, I may return. In the latter connection, I should note that my name is still carried, on leave of absence, on the roster of the University of Montana. Moreover, thanks to a seniority system in college teaching, second not even to that of the Congress, I now hold the rank of full Professor of History.

I am constrained to point out that teaching and legislating are the two outstanding examples in American society of the application of a major tenet of Confucianism: that the accumulation of years is to be equated automatically and unquestioningly with the accumulation of wisdom. This principle, I know, is insufferable to the young, tolerable to the middle-aged, and a comfort to those full of years. At this point in time, I must confess that I find a system of seniority tolerably comfortable.

For the present, I have no hesitancy in invoking the authority with which seniority endows me, in order that I may speak to you on what seems to me to be the central concerns of contemporary American foreign policy. Since the end of World War II, I have watched clusters of international problems coalesce into these concerns. The problems cover a whole range of new and tumultuous change. They are, in part, ironic by-products of the immense acceleration of development in science, education and communication, transportation and other technologies. They are expressive of the explosion in population as well as the explosion of nuclear devices. They are indicative of the growth of human expectations and, hopefully, of human enlightenment. They are problems, however, which despite these new twists, are still undergirded by the vast heritage of human ignorance, fear, want, and hostility from which no part of the globe, is free.

The iceberg of change which has moved in international affairs during the past two decades helps to explain the emergence of the U.N. and other international organizations. It is relevant to the social instability and the militarism which have largely followed the ending of 19th century colonial era, notably in Africa. It is involved in the Asian catacylsms—the great economic stirrings in Japan, the immense uncertainties which brood over India and Pakistan and the political tidal waves which, at intervals, have rolled through Chinese society.

The many-sided changes in the human condition during the past two decades also explain the first military alliance in peacetime between ourselves and Western Europe as well as the first major military involvements of the United States on the Asian mainland. They help to explain, finally, the awakening of this nation to the problems which confront the world and ourselves as participants in its indivisible destiny.

It used to be that we tended to stand apart and aloof from the affairs of the rest of the globe. Some have called that period of our history which led up to World War II, the age of isolation. The characterization is glib and somewhat misleading. We were not so much isolated as we were insulated by a fortuitous geographic endowment. The greater part of the nation's historic energies, therefore, could, and fortunately did, go inward into the development of a rich, ample, and sparsely settled land. We had little need or inclination which would stimulate us to look much beyond this endowment for our needs and—if I may use the term—for our kicks. Except to sustain a limited curiosity and to satisfy a few exotic wants, we avoided an extensive overseas projection of American power, particularly outside the Western Hemisphere. From a distance, we were content to hold ourselves up to the rest of the world, on the basis of great material achievements and the political heritage of the American Revolution, as a prime example of the perfectability of the national experience.

Since World War II, however, we have found ourselves plunged, hands, feet, and head into the mainstream of the world's affairs. We did not seek this role. We did not want it. Most of us still find the clothes of a great international power, costly, ill-fitting and uncomfortable. Nevertheless, we are unable to get out of them. There is even the probability that some of us have learned not only to tolerate this new garb, but to like it.

In any event, as a sequel to World War II, this nation has come onto the center of the stage of international affairs. In this leading role we have expended an immense amount of resources, energy, and money for a great variety of purposes. We have developed all manner of costly intelligence and informational services. We have developed towering military services whose annual cost is now around $70 billion.

We have fought one war in Asia, and are now engaged in a second. We have narrowly missed involvement in several other peripheral clashes elsewhere. More than twenty years after World War II, we still have something on the order of agreements for mutual security with 40 or more nations. These agreements, in effect, are commitments to military action everywhere on the globe, except, perhaps, the Antarctic. The strategic air force is on a minutes-alert. Intercontinental and other missiles are pre-set for instant retaliatory launching. Day and night the American navy patrols the seven seas. American soldiers are stationed in many nations abroad; in Europe and Viet Nam, they number in the hundreds of thousands.

These far-flung commitments have been questioned from time to time. In my judgment, it is most proper that pertinent questions be raised about them. Not only do they involve great expenditures of public funds, they carry, at all times, immense implications for the very survival of the nation and civilization. As I see it, we have undertaken so many and scattered defense obligations that any need for the simultaneous honoring of a group of these commitments would find us hard-pressed to provide even a limited response. For that reason, if for no other, it seems to me we would be well-advised to look closely at these military commitments and activities and to weigh carefully their contemporary value.

It would be futile, however, to consider them in a vacuum. Effective surveillance must relate to the central concerns of our foreign policy which, presumably, gave rise to them in the first place. It behooves us to see as clearly as possible whether our understanding of these concerns is up to date. It is incumbent upon us to test and test again the reflexes of our policies not only for adequacy but for excess.

It will serve no useful purpose to continue to measure these reflexes of policy by the sort of generalities which are expressed by the terms "isolationism" or "internationalism." Whatever may have been the case years ago, these yardsticks have long since lost their pertinence. The labels are no guarantee of the efficacy of any course of action or nonaction in international relations. What is essential is not the name. What is essential is that the course is timely and adjusts the bonafide interests of the nation to the realities of the contemporary world.

I speak in all candor when I say that there have been tendencies under both Democratic and Republican administrations for foreign policy to lag behind these realities. Until recently, a kind of inertia, for example, has existed with regard to one of the central concerns of American foreign policy—the United States-Soviet confrontation in Europe. Until recently, we have been most reluctant to bring ourselves to face, in policy, the changes which have taken place on that continent.

To be sure, President Eisenhower sought in his administration to restore at least a measure of civility in the conduct of U.S.-Soviet affairs, by his personal associations with the leaders of the Soviet Union. To be sure, President Kennedy, in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, removed a rigidity which, for years had decreed that agreements should not be concluded with the Soviet Union. It has only been in the last year or two, however, that as a nation we have begun to explore fully the implications of change in Europe and to react to its potentialities in terms of our interests and world peace.

Yet substantial change has been manifest for some time in inner developments in both Eastern Europe and in Western Europe and between the two regions. In Eastern Europe, the immediate postwar isolation from the

West was a severe one. It was compounded of political and war-born vendettas, ideological parochialisms, reciprocal fears and the inturning of human energy to meet the massive demands of post-war reconstruction. Especially since the death of Stalin, however, there has been a general loosening of the ideological and other strait-jackets throughout Eastern Europe. There has also been a growing response on the part of governments there to consumer needs, the satisfaction of which involves greatly expanded commerce with the non-Communist world.

As indicative of the breadth of change, communications, travel, cultural exchange and other contacts have grown rapidly between Eastern and Western Europe. The rise of trade levels between the two regions has been very pronounced, and it should be noted that, Berlin Wall notwithstanding, West Germany leads all other non-Communist nations in commerce with Eastern Europe.

For those who read the tea leaves of official socialability, moreover, I would call attention to the recent visits of President Podgorny of the Soviet Union to Italy and the first reception of a Chief of that State by the Pope, as well as Premier Kosygin's warm receptions in Paris and London. One may attach such values as he chooses to these events. The facts of change in Europe, however, speak for themselves. The talk of war subsidies; the sounds of intra-European cooperation are heard more clearly on all sides. The European detente has not only begun, it is already well advanced.

Our reaction to change in Europe includes the groundwork of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy as well as the bridge-building of President Johnson, all of which I have already mentioned.

What is involved in the latter case is a sustained effort in the direction of restoring normalcy to our relations with the Soviet Union and a significant reduction in the military rivalry which, wittingly or unwittingly, could lead to a catastrophic conflict.

A number of significant agreements with the Soviet Union are already involved in this effort. They deal with cultural exchanges, consular questions, commercial aviation, and the peaceful use of outer space. Negotiations are also anticipated, in the near future, to try to limit the incredibly costly rivalry of adding successive and reciprocal "antis" to the ballistic missile systems of each nation. An attempt is also likely to be made to remove certain long-standing and self-imposed hindrances in law to our peaceful trade with the Eastern European countries.

Many of these measures, of course, involve not only the President but also action by the Congress and, particularly, by the Senate. And, certainly, they involve understanding on the part of the people of the nation. However, emotions run deep on any question of U.S. relations with Communist nations, particularly, in the light of the bloody conflict in Viet Nam. I am frank to say that I have my own reticences about the pursuit of agreements with nations on one side of the globe, while a war against us is being waged with their help on the other. The best judgments we can obtain, however, tell us that the rejection of the contemplated agreements with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will not make the slightest difference in the situation in Viet Nam. It will, in no way, diminish our casualties or hasten the conclusion of the conflict.

In those circumstances, I do not see that it serves our purposes to turn our backs on agreements which would otherwise be in the interest of this nation. I do not see that we advance the cause of peace by refusing to build more stable relations for peace whenever and wherever an opportunity to do so presents itself.

Moreover, bridge-building to Eastern Europe is not unrelated to the possibility of making constructive changes in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, changes which would also serve the nation's interests. For many years, six divisions of American forces have been consigned to N.A.T.O. in Western Europe. These forces and their dependents involve a U.S. military establishment in Western Europe of well over half a million Americans. It is an undertaking which represents an expenditure of billions of dollars of public funds each year. Yet, I would not begrudge one cent of these funds if I were persuaded that the six divisions were as essential to peace in Europe, today, as they were believed to be when dispatched there years ago.

But is that the case? I have already mentioned the change in the general climate in Europe which expresses itself in a rapidly growing trade and the expansion of other friendly relations. It should also be noted that within Western Europe, there are obvious doubts about the need for the maintenance of N.A.T.O. at the strength in which it was previously projected. Indeed, the French no longer see any requirement for the presence of U.S. forces, at least not in France, and they have withdrawn their own detachments from N.A.T.O. Command. The United Kingdom has reduced its commitment of men and resources to the Continent and has announced further reductions unless West Germany is prepared to neutralize the exchange costs of maintaining these forces on the Rhine. Other Western Europeans to a greater or lesser degree appear to regard their N.A.T.O. commitments in the same non-urgent fashion.

It is now very evident that the United States alone has felt deeply the need to sustain the full military burden of the earlier common commitment to N.A.T.O. Our allies in Western Europe are much closer to the firing line; yet, in a period of unprecedented economic prosperity they are most unwilling to carry their pledged share. In effect, the Western Europeans have made adjustments in their commitments to N.A.T.O. to reflect over-all changes in Europe and they have made these adjustments unilaterally.

The contrast in performance between ourselves and Western Europe regarding commitments to N.A.T.O. in my judgment, is becoming almost an embarrassment. It moves us apart from the mainstream of European developments and is likely to become a source of friction on both sides which, in the end, can only be harmful to the interests of both sides.

In all frankness, I find it difficult to acquiesce in Executive Branch fears for Western Europe's safety which are obviously far greater than the fear of the Europeans themselves. In all frankness, I find some lack of dignity in the lengths to which these fears have carried our diplomacy. We have begged, badgered and buttered Western Europe in an effort to stimulate a greater contribution to N.A.T.O. In all frankness, I did not relish this nation having been placed in the position of wearing out its welcome in France. I should not like to see that experience repeated elsewhere in Europe. Yet it may well be repeated unless there is a willingness to make timely adjustments.

I have, therefore, joined with 43 other Senators in the introduction of a resolution which recommends to the President that the Executive Branch make substantial reductions in the present deployment of our forces in Western Europe. Personally, I have felt for several years that two or three rather than six divisions would be more than sufficient to underscore our adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty. That figure is in line with estimates of present need which have been advanced by General Eisenhower and General Gavin, both of whom have had a long association with this question. I find it most difficult to comprehend why two divisions are any less effective than six in serving notice that we regard the pledge of the North Atlantic Treaty as binding and our national security as inseparable from that of the North Atlantic region. To talk of six divisions as a manifestation of international resolution and two divisions as an indication of a revived isolationism is to reveal how irrelevant if not downright misleading these terms have become.

On the other side of the globe, in Asia, there looms another central concern of American foreign policy. It is the confrontation with China, across the littoral states of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Viet Nam.

Almost two decades have passed since the collapse of the national government on the Chinese mainland and its retreat to the island of Taiwan. That event, which occurred when most of you were too young for it to be noticed, was cataclysmic in its consequences. It sundered the fabric of Chinese society and, almost overnight, brought about the disintegration of a main pillar of post-war American foreign policy. In the rubble, the watch-word became "wait for the dust to settle" before doing anything about China.

Over the years, the cut-off of contact between ourselves and the Chinese mainland has become, for all practical purposes, total. Americans do not go there. Mainland Chinese do not come here. There is not only an absence of personal contact, there is also a complete absence of trade and communications. Indeed, of all the nations of the world we alone have not only maintained a primary boycott for many years but also seek to enforce a secondary boycott on Chinese exports.

We have had brief confrontations with Chinese spokesmen on various issues over the years, notably at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962. Our sole continuing diplomatic contact with the Peking government, however, has been the meetings between the U.S. and Chinese Ambassadors in Poland which have gone on regularly for many years and at which no business of significance, so far as I am aware, has been conducted.

In short, "witing for the dust to settle," has remained the watchword of this nation's relations with three-quarters of a billion Chinese through the administrations of three Presidents. In truth, the dust has not settled. The initial hostility between a revolutionary China for which we had had little sympathy and ourselves was followed almost immediately by the Korean Conflict in which we became directly engaged in military conflict with the Chinese. Thereafter came the near conflict at the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits. And now, there is again conflict, this time, by proxy in Viet Nam.

Within China, during these years there have been momentous events which have also added to the difficulties and uncertainties of developing a cohesive policy towards the Chinese mainland. The Chinese have exploded nuclear devices at Lop Nor in the Western Asian desert of Sinkiang. Recent ideological conflicts have sent great tremors through the whole of the inner political structure of China. There has been, finally, the great cleavage in Sino-Soviet revolutionary solidarity which has torn apart almost all of the relationships between the two giant nations of the Eurasian Continent.

In the context of these events, it is not surprising that the dust, for the settlement of which American policy has waited eighteen years, is heavier than ever. The obscurity, moreover, is not likely to be dispelled in the near future. There is nothing in the recent history of China which suggests that it will be easier tomorrow than it is today for us to see clearly a direction for effective policy. Whatever course of American relations with China, it will have to be pursued in spite of the dust with which the situation is covered.

Clear-cut choices cannot be expected to be available to us any time in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, American decisions

respecting China must inevitably contain a large measure of subjectivity and prayer. Ever-present, will be the possibility of error. These considerations, may I say, apply not only to what we may do respecting China but to what we do not do. The uncertainties and the risks exist no less in the principle of non-approach to which we have adhered over these years of our times. History will someday estimate the contribution of this principle—its addition to or subtraction from the interests of the United States and the stability and peace of the Western Pacific.

Under the present approach, for example, we know from a distance that a great fire rages in the core of Chinese Communism. The manifestations are plain in the roars of the Red Guards, in the denunciations and counter-denunciations, in the sudden fall of long-established revolutionaries. They are documented in the inflammatory ideographs which are slashed over the streets and walls of Peking and the other citadels of Chinese Communist power. They are suggested in the political bewilderment which is seen in coastal cities and in the provinces along the inner borders of China and other remote areas.

Indeed, the present turmoil is such as to make clear that Communist political control which, for nearly two decades, was held by many to be total and irreversible and to extend all the way from Moscow to the farthest reaches of China is actually considerably less than absolute, even in its extension from Peking to the distant Chinese provinces.

We can also note, from afar, the serious difficulties between the Soviet Union and China. The strains have long been explicit in the ideological realm. They have also become increasingly evident in the tension along the Sino-Soviet frontier which runs for thousands of miles between the two countries. What appears involved here is an expression of the historic projection of Czarist Russian interests across the Asian mainland towards Alaska and which, before it receded to more tractable limits, had spread even as far as California and Hawaii. This basic Russian projection to the East persists and rubs against China, at least in border regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, and in Sinkiang Province. Conversely, an historic Chinese interest remains in many parts of Soviet Asia which at various times have been under at least nominal Chinese authority. The clash of national interests of the two nations, in short, is very real and so, too, are the irredentist hostilities which it engenders.

These hostilities have been a major element in the cycle of ever-increasing bitterness in Chinese-Soviet relations over the past few years. How long this cycle will last and how it will end are matters of conjecture. Whatever the possibilities, if any, of more effective adjustment of our policies in the light of this and other trends, however, we are inhibited from their pursuit by our current approach or, rather, non-approach to mainland China.

Let me turn, finally, to the immediate and over-riding problem of policy, to the situation in Viet Nam. Viet Nam affects every other aspect of our foreign relations and, particularly, the two central concerns. It diminishes our capacity to deal constructively with the United States- Soviet confrontation in Europe. To put it mildly, it multiplies the problems of the confrontation with China in Asia.

It is ironic that once again in Viet Nam, as in Korea, a country so small and remote from our interests as to be outside the range of even public curiosity a few years ago has become the major preoccupation of the United States. It is ironic that, for the second time in a generation, we find ourselves in a devastating war on the borders of China—not with China—but with a people who have had no tradition of hostility towards the United States and who have far more historic reason than do we for mutual hostility with the Chinese.

How deeply we are engaged in this ironic situation is indicated by the current concentration of United States military force in Southeast Asia and, particularly, in Viet Nam. We have well in excess of 400,000 military personnel on the ground in South Viet Nam. There are also approximately 75,000 men on the 7th Fleet in adjacent waters and 35,000 more in Thailand with responsibilities that are tied closely into the situation in Viet Nam. In short, we have committed to this conflict over 500,000 members of the Armed Services and materiel and equipment in unprecedented quantities and this immense consignment is supported by additional military strength of all kinds on Okinawa, the Philippines, and Guam.

We are in a limited war in which, by becoming deeply engaged, we have managed to save from collapse the government of South Viet Nam in Saigon. The objectives of our military engagement are confined entirely to the southern half of Viet Nam. This limited war of limited objectives, nevertheless, has already engaged more American forces than Korea. It has cost more than Korea. It has incurred plane and helicopter losses greatly in excess of those in Korea. It is a more difficult and dangerous war than Korea. It is a more bitter and barbaric war. It is a war whose end is not yet in sight, by military action or by a negotiated diplomatic solution.

That is the reality of the situation in Viet Nam. The more candidly it is faced the better off we will be. At this point, the question of how or why we became involved is moot and so are regrets over our involvement. In my judgment, the question now is how can this war be ended at the soonest possible moment in an honorable peace for ourselves and for all deeply enmeshed in it. In short, the question is how can it be ended under honorable circumstances, before the spreading devastation, not only in North Viet Nam, but even more, in South Viet Nam, makes a hideous mockery of the original objective of helping the Vietnamese people.

I do not believe that we can end this war by slogans of "get in or get out." It cannot be ended by personal criticism of the President and the Vice President, Ambassador Goldberg and other leaders of the Administration or members of the Senate, regardless of the positions which they take on this issue. I am frank to say that this criticism, at times, goes far beyond the merely ungracious and borders on the disgraceful. President Johnson wants this war ended in an honorable peace and every Senator I know, and I know them all, wants the same thing. If there are differences among us they are differences of understanding, interpretation, and method.

In my personal view, and have made it clear many times, the conflict cannot be terminated in an honorable fashion by a withdrawal of the United States at this time although an honorable settlement must eventually involve the withdrawal of United States forces.

The only practical avenue which I see open, for the present, is to seek to mitigate the horror of the conflict and to restrain its spread, while endeavoring to pursue any avenue, byway, route or whatever, as the President has sought to do, which might lead to the negotiating table. That there has not yet been an initiation of substantial contact for peace is no argument against the continuance of the effort to make that contact. There can be no relaxation until the war is brought to an end in negotiations. It is essential that we pursue peace in Viet Nam in all sincerity and with all diligence not only because, in this situation, peace has a rational and moral validity, but also because a prompt settlement is in the interests of the Vietnamese people and the interests of the American people.

I must say, with great regret, that signs of a settlement in the near future are lacking. There is, instead, the fact of an ugly war of spreading devastation. All the while, the options are running out; the alternatives which might lead to negotiations grow fewer.

Many proposals have been put forth and mnay have been explored. As an example, over the past year or more I have publicly called attention to these possible easements of the situation and for eventual settlement:

1. In lieu of aerial bombardment of North Viet Nam, the sealing off of the borders of the 17th parallel, through Laos;

2. A reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 agreements by call of the cochairmen, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, or by any participating conferees;

3. An all-Asian conference at Rangoon or Tokyo or any other suitable location to consider the conditions of an honorable peace;

4. The inclusion in any peace conference of whatever belligerents may be necessary to bring about a termination of the conflict in Viet Nam;

5. An enlargement of the Manila Conference of 1966 into a follow-up conference, to include friend and foe alike;

6. A face-to-face meeting of the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and the Foreign Minister of the Peking government to discuss the restoration of peace in Viet Nam.

In addition, I have urged that the closest considertaion be given to informed French views on Viet Nam and to the views of the Cambodian Premier, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. I have urged that the proposals of U Thant and Mrs. Gandhi be considered. I have endorsed various statements of the President, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Goldberg, all of which have made clear that not only our proposals but also those of Hanoi and the People's Liberation Front might provide a basis for settlement. I have recommended that there be not just a cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam but that all killing stop, on both sides, in a ceasefire and standfast, on the ground and in the waters adjacent to Viet Nam as well as over Viet Nam, to the end that efforts may be made to initiate talks.

In some of these proposals, the President has concurred and has had them pursued by his diplomats. All of them, he has had examined and if they have not been pursued, I can only conclude that there have been sound reasons for not pursuing them. Suggestions for peace have come from many sources; the actual pursuit of peace in the past year, however, has been by diplomacy and, largely, by secret diplomacy. Indeed, that is the case even with the efforts of the distinguished Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant. In his attempts to bring about peace in Viet Nam, U Thant has acted in his personal and diplomatic capacity rather than in his Secretarial capacity of carrying out organizational decisions of the United Nations.

The fact is that the U.N., as an organization, has not yet entered into the Vietnamese problem. Some limited use of the U.N. in this fashion, may I say, was proposed in an address which I delivered at Johns Hopkins University in November, 1966. At the time, it was not suggested that the United Nations be brought directly into the substance of the dispute; that course presents great difficulties because neither North Viet Nam nor China are member states. What I did suggest, however, was an entirely proper and precedented procedural initiative by the United Nations. The Security Council can issue, at any time, by majority vote a call to all belligerents in Viet Nam to convene in its forum. It would be entirely in order for an invitation of this kind to include both China and North Viet Nam.

It was further suggested last November that a basis for a negotiated settlement could begin to be sought in a Security Council request to the International Court for an advisory opinion on the applicability of the

Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. I am delighted to note, in passing, that Congress only last week expressed its overwhelming formal endorsement of these agreements as a basis for a negotiated settlement.

I betray no confidences when I note that, on request, I interrupted a brief vacation last fall to go to New York for the sole purpose of discussing these two proposals regarding the possible usage of the U.N. organization with Ambassador Goldberg and the Secretary-General. On the basis of these discussions it seemed preferable at the time that the search for peace then being actively pursued be continued via the private avenues of diplomacy rather than in the forum of the Security Council.

That was many weeks and months ago. In the interim, intense and many-sided efforts of diplomacy have been exerted through many private channels to find the key to peace. Hopes rose during the cease-fires at the Christmas holidays and at Tet, the Oriental New Year. However, in the end, diplomacy not only was unable to find a road to negotiations, it was not able even to bring about an extension of these truces.

The Pope tried. The Russian and British leaders have tried. The Secretary-General of the U.N., in his diplomatic capacity, has tried. Ambassador Goldberg has tried countless times. Many other diplomats and officials of the Executive Branch of the government have tried.

The strenuous efforts of traditional diplomacy have been unavailing. As indicated by recent statements of both Ambassador Goldberg and U Thant, the slender reed of hope has shriveled. There is now no immediate prospect on the horizon, except for the intensification of the conflict. That, indeed, is already in progress. The casualties increase; the devastation grows; the dangers of expanded war multiply.

In the circumstances, it seems to me that a contribution to peace might well be sought in public from the United Nations as an organization. The Secretary-General's personal efforts to date have been dedicated and strenuous and he is entitled to the gratitude and support of the entire world community. With all due respect, however, there are other resources for peace inherent in the United Nations, as an organization, which have gone untapped and untried. The U.N. does have a responsibility to try to contribute to the resolution of this conflict. That responsibility is explicit in the Charter and every member nation, including ourselves, shares that responsibility by solemn Treaty obligation.

It seems to me that the cause of a paceful and honorable settlement may possibly be advanced—certainly it cannot be hurt—by modest recourse at this time to the procedural machinery of the United Nations. In my judgment, this nation should consider seeking a face-to-face confrontation of all belligerents at the United Nations. Following the Korean precedents, it seems to me eminently desirable that this government give every consideration to a possible initiative which would bring to a vote in the Security Council two resolutions along the following lines:

One, that the Security Council invite all belligerents, direct and indirect, including China and North Viet Nam, to participate in an open discussion of the conflict in Viet Nam and ways and means of ending it;

Two, that the Security Council request the International Court to render an advisory opinion on the current applicability of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the obligations which these agreements may place on the present belligerents in Viet Nam.

Whether or not there is much prospect of a positive response from others in no way lessens the desirability of offering these resolutions in good faith and bringing them to a vote. In my judgment, an American initiative of this kind serves not only our interests but the interests of peace in Viet Nam.

Let me conclude, now, by clarifying one point: the conflict in Viet Nam cannot be settled from the Congress or from the campus. In the end, if it is to be settled honorably, there is only one Constitutional officer of your government who can speak for you and for the entire nation in its foreign relations. Whether we agree with him or not, whether we like him or not, whether we abhor him or love him, that man is the President of the United States.

In a government such as ours, a Senator lives with a Constitution, a constituency, and a conscience. All three considerations underlie the suggestions respecting Viet Nam which have been made here today and others which have ben expressed on other occasions. President Johnson and all the Presidents who have gone before him have listened to advice from many sources, including the Senate.

It is the President, however, who makes the fundamental decisions of foreign policy. These decisions are of an immensity which enjoins upon us all a high respect for the burdens which a President must bear and a responsibility to tender to him every support which can be given in good conscience. In the end, these decisions will determine—insofar as it lies with this nation to determine—the moment of peace in Viet Nam and Asia.

EXHIBIT 3

CRITICAL COMPONENTS OF CURRENT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

(Remarks of Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat, of Montana, the Koblitz Memorial Lecture, the Temple, April 30, 1967, Cleveland, Ohio)

Along with rabbis, ministers and priests, a member of the Senate is among those most acutely aware of the great range of problems which face the nation and give rise to its principle anxieties. Both in domestic and international matters, Senators are compelled by their responsibilities to chart a course through a maze of disturbing public issues.

A Senator's guide in this process is a kind of triangle. At the base is the United States Constitution. One of the sides is his constituency, the other his conscience. For each Senator, the three angles are adjusted differently. During any session of Congress, however, all Senators are confronted with the need to make decisions which, in the end, are enclosed in this triangle.

A Senator's duties also have a tripartite character. They involve a contribution to a responsive Congress in a government which is responsive to domestic needs and which governs our relationship with the rest of the world by means of a responsive foreign policy. Three of the Senate's actions during this session of Congress is illustrative.

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1967, which recently passed the Senate, points the way to the first major updating of Congressional procedures in two decades. The revision and extension of the Appalachian Act which the Senate approved a few days ago is a response to the current needs of a multi-state region left stranded by the shifting tides of economic development. Senate consent to ratifictaion of a Consular Treaty with the Soviet Union is a response to the President's effort to bring about better relations not only with that nation but with all of Eastern Europe.

These three measures share a common characteristic. In their intent, all seek to keep pace with change. It is to the factor of change—to changes in the international situation—that I would first address your attention. In the two decades since World War II, we have seen a drastic revision in the political composite of continents. We have witnessed the emergence and growth of the United Nations and other international groupings of nations. We have been almost overwhelmed by a mass outpouring of developments in science and technology. We have been present at the addition of the nth power of nuclear weapons to the already complicated equations upon which rest world peace and civilized survival. We have been compelled to face the frightful gaps in the material well-being of the world's peoples and to confront the dilemmas which the rapid growth of population poses to efforts to close these gaps.

The extent of change over the past two decades is also suggested in the contrast of the haunted, war-ravaged Europe of 1946 and the glittering, assertive Europe of 1967. It is sensed in the strivings for human betterment throughout Latin America and Africa and in other underdeveloped regions. In Asia, the force of change is illuminated by the extraordinary recovery and the technological advance of Japan. It is felt in the vast tremors in Chinese society.

It used to be that we were so immersed in change within our own nation that our concern for change beyond our borders was minimal. Some speak of that not so distant time as an age of isolationism. Actually, we were not so much isolated as we were insulated in a much less complicated world by an exhilirating national experience and by a fortuitous geography. Our energies, fortunately, could be directed largely to the inner development of a nation which was as sparsely settled as it was plentifully endowed. There was little need for us to look elsewhere for our challenges. The changing American frontier—physical, scientific and economic—was as stimulating and as promising of personal fulfillment as any in the world. Except to indulge a limited curiosity and to cater to a few exotic wants, we were inclined to avoid an extensive overseas projection of American power.

We did not seek our present involvement in world affairs. Even on the eve of Pearl Harbor, as a nation, we were reluctant to accept it. Yet, as a sequel to World War II, we became deeply and irrevocably immersed in the affairs of the rest of the world.

During the past two decades, we have directed tremendous resources, human energy and national power into a multitude of activities abroad. The cost of aid programs of one kind or another, for example, has run to tens of billions of dollars over these years and tens of thousands of Americans have gone abroad at one time or another to carry out those programs. We have established widespread intelligence networks and international information services. We have a military structure which costs around $70 billion each year; under it, since the end of World War II, millions of Americans have been sent abroad.

The strategic air force is on a minutes-alert. Intercontinental and other missiles are fused for almost instantaneous reprisals. Our navy is based in scattered parts of the globe and is on constant patrol of the Seven Seas. American forces are stationed in innumerable nations. In Europe as well as in Viet Nam, the level of this deployment, today, reaches to hundreds of thousands.

In the two decades since World War II, our armed forces have fought in Korea and now fight in Viet Nam and they have incurred tens of thousands of casualties in the process. We have skirted other grave conflicts elsewhere in Asia and elsewhere in the world. In the Cuban confrontation, the nuclear clock was stopped at one minute to midnight by a stroke of wise and restrained diplomacy.

We have entered into so many mutual security agreements—some forty pacts—that we are committed to military action in every part of the globe except, perhaps, Antarctica. The wisdom of these far-flung commitments has been questioned from time to time, and in my judgment, properly so. Defense obligations are now so enormous and so dispersed

that were the operative provisions of a number of these commitments to come into play simultaneously, our ability to discharge them, short of nuclear conflagration, would be most doubtful.

In my judgment, all outstanding military commitments and activities ought to be subject to continuous scrutiny as to their current validity. From time to time we close surplus military bases at home. We ought not to be reluctant, in any sense, to reduce costly commitments abroad just as rapidly as their utility becomes questionable and their foreign policy purposes obsolete.

In this connection, I would note the large U.S. military deployment in Europe. For a number of years, six U.S. divisions have been stationed in Western Europe under NATO. These forces plus dependents add up to a quasi-permanent military establishment in Europe of over half a million Americans.

The annual outlay for this commitment amounts to billions of dollars. Many have urged a reduction of the deployment on the basis of cost or the gold drain and balance of payments difficulties or because of the competing needs of Viet Nam. The costs of the European deployment, to be sure, are a pressure on the domestic economy and the international position of the dollar. The expanding war in Viet Nam, to be sure, is an open pit in terms of its ever-growing requirements for men, skills, and materiel.

However, the critical issue with respect to the U.S. deployment on European soil is not, in my judgment, a financial one; nor is it the competing needs of Viet Nam. If we require the present level of forces in Europe, the nation can find a way to deal with the financial and other difficulties which may be involved. The issue is whether our security, the security of the North Atlantic region and the security of Western Europe—twenty years after World War II—continue to compel the concentration of six American divisions on the other side of the Atlantic.

What is involved here is the accuracy of our current estimates of one of the critical components of our foreign policy. We need to ask ourselves whether conditions in Europe have changed since NATO was established. We need to ask ourselves whether the present level of the American commitment is out of step with that change.

Let us not delude ourselves; while our military deployment under NATO has not changed for many years, circumstances in Europe have changed greatly in recent years. They have changed in Russia and Eastern Europe. They have changed in Germany and Western Europe. When the troop commitment to NATO was assumed, the keynote of relations between the Soviet East and Western Europe was one of mutual suspicion and hostility. That is not the case now. Today, the tone of intra-European relations has the ring of a reasonableness that borders on cordiality.

Vice President Humphrey, on returning from his recent trip to Western Europe, was quoted as predicting that in 20 years the Iron Curtain would be replaced with an open door. Whatever the situation may be two decades hence, I venture to suggest, today, two decades after World War II, that the door is already much more than slightly ajar, as between Eastern and Western Europe.

The change in the general climate in Europe is reflected in the attitudes of the Western Europeans toward NATO. At one time, the European allies joined with us in a willing pledge of manpower and resources to the buildup of NATO. Today, the actions of the Western Europeans speak far louder than words. The actions suggest that they have long since abandoned earlier common concepts of NATO force goals, at least insofar as providing their share of manpower and materiel may be involved.

The French reaction in this respect has been abrupt and to the point. Although still adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty, France has withdrawn all divisions and other detachments from NATO. Moreover, President de Gaulle has required the removal of NATO headquarters from French territory. Great Britain has decreased its commitment of men and resources to NATO and is contemplating a further cutback of its army of the Rhine. Indeed, all of the European NATO members, to one extent or another, have lowered the priority they attach to their military consignments to the NATO command.

It can hardly be financial difficulties that have caused the European allies to veer sharply from earlier military pledges; in an economic sense Western Europe is far more capable of meeting these pledges today than when they were made. The retrenchment, instead, appears to be grounded in the conviction that the style in which NATO was originally tailored is no longer the mode for Europe.

In these circumstances, it seems a paradox that we—alone and apart from our Western European allies—have felt some compelling need to maintain at full strength the pledged deployment of forces in Western Europe. The fears for the safety of that region against Soviet aggression are obviously far greater in the Executive Branch of the United States government than they are in the European chanceries.

This variance of view emphasizes the cataleptic nature of our policy on troop deployment in Europe over the past few years. Of late, there have been indications of a relaxation in this rigidity. Even though the reductions in the deployment which are being discussed would appear wholly inadequate, it is to be hoped that there is at least a better appreciation of the realities of change in Europe.

Early this year, I joined with 43 other Senators in introducing a resolution which recommends to the President that the Executive Branch make a substantial reduction in the U.S. military deployment in Europe. In my judgment, the actual size of the U.S. establishment in Europe ought to bear some relationship to what other NATO members are prepared to do with regard to the common defense. On this basis, I have believed for some time that two or three U.S. divisions would be more in accord with current realities than the six which are stationed in Europe. The lower figure would be no less effective in emphasizing that we regard the pledge of mutual defense of the North Atlantic Treaty as binding and that we hold our national security as inseparable from that of Western Europe and the North Atlantic region.

In all candor, I believe there have been strong tendencies to inertia in foreign policy, under Democratic no less than Republican administrations. The NATO situation, as I have just discussed it, is but one case in point. A lag is also reflected in policies toward Eastern Europe. Only in recent years have these policies begun to take cognizance of the changes in that region.

It is true that President Eisenhower sought in his administration to reverse some of the excesses of cold war recrimination. He tried to restore at least some civility to the conduct of U.S.-Soviet affairs, for example, by his personal association with Mr. Khrushchev and other leaders of the Soviet Union. It is true, too, that during President Kennedy's administration, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty removed a rigidity which for years had decreed that no agreements, regardless of how useful, should be concluded with the Soviet Union. It is only been in the last year or two, however, that as a nation we have opened our eyes to the extent of change in Eastern Europe and have begun to explore vigorously its potentialities. We tend no longer to react with an automatic "nyet" when opportunities for understanding and mutual advantage appear. Rather, there is a new sense of discernment which weighs opportunities in terms of our national interest and implications for a more durable peace.

The fact is that such opportunities have been manifest for some time as a result not only of changes in Eastern Europe but also in the attitudes of that region towards Western Europe. After World War II, the schism in the continent was a severe one. It was compounded of ancient rivalries, war-born vendettas, ideological parochialism, reciprocal fears and the inner absorption of human energy in order to meet the great demands of survival and reconstruction which existed in each war-shattered region.

After the death of Stalin, however, there was a general loosening of straitjackets throughout Eastern Europe. This development was manifested in various ways and notably in the growing response to consumer needs on the part of the Communist governments. The satisfaction of these needs, in turn, involved expanded commerce with the non-Communist world and Western Europe was quick to welcome it.

The rise of trade levels between the two regions in the past decade has been very pronounced. It should be noted, moreover, that—Berlin Wall notwithstanding—West Germany leads all other non-Communist nations in commerce with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There has also been a rapid growth of communications, travel, cultural exchange and other contacts between Eastern and Western Europe in the last few years. How far this process has gone is indicated by a recent Yugoslavian announcement that visas would no longer be required of visitors from the West!

These facts of change in Europe speak for themselves. The talk of war subsidies; the sounds of intra-European cooperation are heard more clearly on all sides. In short, a European detente has not only begun, it is already well advanced.

Our reaction to change in Europe includes the initial achievements of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy to which I have already alluded, as well as the international bridge building upon which President Johnson has embarked. What is involved in the latter case is a sustained effort in the direction of restoring normalcy to our relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations. At the same time, the President is seeking a significant reduction in the military-technological rivalry which, wittingly or unwittingly, could lead the world into a catastrophic conflict.

A number of significant agreements with the Soviet Union are already associated with this effort. They deal with cultural exchanges, consular questions, commercial aviation, and the peaceful use of outer space. Negotiations have been initiated to try to limit the incredibly costly arms competition of adding successive and reciprocal "antis" to the ballistic missile systems of each nation. Most recently, as I have noted, a Consular Treaty with the Soviet Union has been ratified and just a few days ago by a vote of 88 to 0 the Senate consented to the ratification of a treaty on the peaceful use of outer space.

Emotions run deep on any question of U.S. relations with the Communist nations, especially in the light of the bloody conflict in Viet Nam. I am frank to say that I have my own reticences in this connection. The pursuit of agreements with nations of Eastern Europe seems incongruous with the war that is being waged against us with their help on the other side of the globe. The best judgments we can obtain, however, tell us that the rejection of the kinds of agreements which have been made or are projected with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries will not make the slightest difference in the military situation in Viet Nam, that it will, in no way, diminish our casualties or hasten the conclusion of the conflict.

In those circumstances, I do not see that it serves our purpose to turn our backs on agreements which would otherwise be in the interests of this nation. I do not see that we advance the general cause of peace by refusing to build more stable relations whenever and where ever an opportunity to do so is presented.

If the changes in Europe constitute one of the critical components of the situation with which United States foreign policy must concern itself, a second is to be found in Asia. Along the littoral of the Western Pacific, there looms the unspoken but no less profound confrontation with China across the states of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Viet Nam.

In that region, we have yet to resolve the dilemmas of policy which were posed by the overthrow of the national government on the Chinese mainland almost two decades ago. That cataclysmic event compelled the complete recasting of our relations with China. In the space of a few postwar years, the framework of our relations with the Chinese central government altered from one of great intimacy to one of great hostility. The Russians replaced us in the role of friend and mentor in the formulations of policy which were undertaken by the Peking People's Republic.

Cast in the role of foreign devil by the new government in Peking, our policy towards the mainland became a non-policy. Of necessity, we settled back to "wait and see." And through the administrations of three Presidents, we have continued to look for the happening which has not happened. We have yet to see clearly either a way to put together the pieces of the policy which collapsed years ago or a way to begin afresh in our relations with the Chinese mainland.

Contacts between ourselves and the Chinese mainland have dwindled almost to the point of non-existence. Americans do not go there; mainland Chinese do not come to the United States. At intervals, U.S. diplomats have had significant encounters with Peking spokesmen on various issues. In 1950, for example, we faced Chinese Communists at the United Nations, on the issues of the Korean conflict. We sat down with the Chinese again at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962, on the issues of Indo-China.

One channel of continuing diplomatic contact with the Peking government has been maintained for many years. It has consisted of regular meetings, first in Geneva and then in Warsaw between the United States and Chinese Ambassadors accredited to Poland. These conversations—brief encounters, perhaps, would be a better term—have occurred with great regularity but not, to my knowledge, with results of any real import.

The absence of travel and diplomatic exchange between China and the United States has been accompanied by a mutual abstention from other customary international relationships, notably those of trade. The fact is that as a matter of official policy, we have wanted no part of trade with China. That is a policy which did not begin with the new bitterness generated by Vietnam. It is more than a decade old. We are the only nation in the world, so far as I am aware, which has sought for years to enforce not only a primary boycott on Chinese exports but also a secondary boycott on re-exported Chinese products.

If the original seeds of hostility were sown, as noted, in China's great revolutionary upheaval, they came to fruition in the Korean conflict in which thousands of casualties were inflicted on each side. That bloody clash was followed by a near conflict over the Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits. Now, once again, in Viet Nam the unresolved hostility with China threatens to bring about another bloody military engagement between ourselves and the Chinese.

In the light of this succession of clashes and near clashes in the Western Pacific it is not surprising that we are still pursuing a policy of "wait and see." Moreover, events inside China have supplied additional blocks to the formulation of positive policies on China. We see these events not firsthand, of course, but second and third-hand. However incomplete this view may be, it is still sufficient to tell us that the Chinese have entered the ranks of those nations with the capability of inflicting nuclear devastation. It is evident, moreover, that there is in progress even now a great ideological strife which gnaws at the inner core of Chinese Communism. The epithets and the accusations and the protest-marches and the inflammatory slogans tell us that political introspection in China is very deep and widespread at this moment. Its impact is being felt particularly in the coastal cities which historically have housed strong Western influences and in the provinces along the inner borders which have long felt the pull of the Russian presence.

Ironically, the Soviet Union has now joined the United States as anathema in the policies of the Peking government. The origin of Sino-Soviet difficulties can be traced historically to the imperial projection which carried Russian influence under the Czars across the Asian mainland into Alaska and as far as California and Hawaii before it began to retract. Over the centuries there have been Sino-Soviet clashes in the border regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang. Indeed, wherever there is a convergence of the interests of China and Russia across the expanses of the tribal lands of Central Asia, ancient antagonisms have periodically been reactivated. In my judgment these historic antagonisms have been a factor second not even to ideological differences in contributing to the bitterness and estrangement in Chinese-Soviet relations over the past several years.

However serious the current difficulties, we ought not to indulge ourselves with the expectation that they will solve our problems in Viet Nam or Asia. Recent developments concerning the supply of materiel to North Viet Nam underscores this point. In spite of the bitter antagonism, the Soviet Union and China have managed to work out an agreement which insures the transshipment of Soviet supplies by way of China to North Viet Nam. The prospect would appear to be, moreover, for a diminution rather than an intensification of Sino-Soviet antipathies at this time. Indeed, in the absence of basic changes in the situation, the level of interdependence between Russia and China is likely to continue to rise the longer the Vietnamese conflict persists.

In any event, we are restrained by the "wait and see" approach from making adjustments of policy which would take cognizance of changes in the Sino-Soviet situation. I might add that we have waited for years, but it is doubtful that we see our way any more clearly today with respect to China than we did a decade and a half ago. China remains a puzzlement, compounded of its immense complexity and our profound bewilderment. It is not likely that events in China will ever fall, like Chinese checkers, into some simple pattern which will make it easy for us to develop a new policy with respect to the Chinese mainland and its three-quarters of a billion people. Whatever course we follow will involve a great measure of uncertainity and a high degree of risk.

That is true for our present course or, more accurately, the non-course. Have we dared to ask ourselves, for example, whether or not the ten or fifteen years in which policy has been in abeyance in regard to the Chinese mainland might bear some responsibility for the tragedy in which we are presently involved in Viet Nam?

Let me turn, then, to that tragedy, to Viet Nam. It is the critical focus of this nation's present anxieties. It commands the attenion of the Administration and the Congress almost to the exclusion of other pressing issues. Abroad, Viet Nam affects every aspect of our foreign relations. As for relations with Europe, the involvement in Viet Nam narrows the scope of response to significant change. As for relations with the Chinese mainland, the involvement in Viet Nam vastly complicates the difficulties which have long been present. Moreover, with every military escalation we are brought closer to another military involvement with China.

It is ironic that a small country whose name, Viet Nam, was scarcely known in the United States twenty years ago has become a critical component of the nation's international affairs. It is ironic that we are engaged on China's border with one of China's "natural enemies" but also with a people for whom we have no tradition of hostility. It is ironic that this phenomenon has occurred twice in less than two decades, the other occasion being, of course, Korea.

One indication of the depth of our involvement in Viet Nam is the great concentration of United States military forces in the Southeast Asian region. On the ground in South Viet Nam there are now more than 430,000 American forces. In the waters, offshore, there are the additional 75,000 men who compose the 7th Fleet. Another 35,000 American soldiers are stationed in Thailand, performing duties which are largely connected with the situation in Viet Nam. In total, then, well over half a million of our armed forces are consigned to the Vietnamese conflict, along with massive amounts of supplies and equipment. These forces are backed by powerful elements of American military strength in Okinawa, the Philippines and Guam.

A year and a half ago, I returned from Viet Nam and reported to Congress and the President that we were engaged in what was, in effect, an open-ended war whose conclusion was not in sight. At that time, the commitment of U.S. forces had not yet reached 150,000 and the bombing of the north was sharply circumscribed. A few days ago, the Commander of the United States forces in Viet Nam, General Westmoreland, told a convention of the Associated Press: "I do not see any end of the war in sight." In the months between these two comments, there has been the immense increase both in the U.S. manpower commitment and the level of military violence. The war, however, remains open-ended; there is not in sight any military way to a conclusion which bears a rational relationship to the original purpose for which the commitment was undertaken. It will be recalled that that purpose was to help the people of South Viet Nam preserve their freedom of political choice and to assist them and all the people of Southeast Asia to build a better material life for themselves.

However it may eventually be brought to an end, it seems to me that the war in Viet Nam is not going to be resolved by personal criticism such as that which, from time to time, has been aimed at the President, the Vice President, Ambassador Goldberg and others. Nor, may I say, will it be resolved by the stifling of the constructive debate of differences in or out of the Senate. Differences of viewpoint, responsibly arrived at and responsibly expressed, in my judgment, are essential to a solution in Viet Nam. Restrained and thoughtful debate of policy is not a luxury, it is a necessity.

Insofar as President Johnson is concerned, he is open to any suggestions which may emerge from discussion and debate and which may hold some promise of peace. He knows as do we that the crucial question is not how this war began but how this war can be ended at the earliest possible moment and in an honorable manner. An honorable ending is not going to be brought about by simplistic formulas such as "get all the way in"

or "get all the way out." An honorable ending is not going to be brought about by the spread of military violence, with its attendant tragedy for all Vietnamese, north and south, for ourselves, and for all concerned.

President Johnson's concern with this tragedy is as deep as yours or mine—deeper perhaps because he has to live with it twenty-four hours a day. The ultimate responsibility in his and, for him, there is no surcease.

Insofar as the Senate is concerned, there are many viewpoints on Viet Nam, but there is unanimity on the desirability of a prompt ending of this war in an honorable peace. Indeed, a few weeks ago by a vote of 89 to 2 the Senate endorsed a continued search by the President and others for a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

As for myself, I have expressed the view many times that the only practicable course is one which seeks to contain a further spread of the conflict in Asia, one which seeks to limit our involvement in the conflict while the effort to achieve an honorable settlement is intensified. The failures so far to find the formula which might tend to lead to negotiations, in no sense, divests us of the obligtion to ourselves, to the Vietnamese people and to the world to continue the search.

To that end, many suggestions have been made. Over the past year or so, for example, I have publicly proposed the following:

1. Military emphasis should be placed on sealing off of the northern border of South Viet Nam at the 17th parallel by the construction of a line of defense which could be maintained largely by South Vietnamese forces as an alternative to the continued bombing of the north.

2. The reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 agreements, by call of the co-chairmen, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, or by any other participants;

3. The holding in Rangoon or Tokyo or in any other suitable place of an all-Asian conference to consider the conditions of an honorable peace in Viet Nam;

4. The inclusion in a peace conference on Viet Nam of any and all governments or groups whose concurrence may be necessary to bring about an end to the conflict;

5. The broadening of the Manila Conference of 1966 to include China and other nonparticipating nations in Asia;

6. The arrangement of a face-to-face meeting of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Foreign Minister of the Peking government to discuss the restoration of peace in Viet Nam.

In addition, I have suggested that our policymakers examine with great care, the views expressed by the French government, as well as by the Cambodian leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. I have urged that the proposals of U Thant and Mrs. Gandhi receive consideration. I have endorsed various statements of the President, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Goldberg, all of which have made clear that not only our proposals but also those of Hanoi and the People's Liberation Front might provide a basis for settlement. I have recommended that there be not just a cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam but a general cease-fire and standfast, with a halt on both sides, to maneuvers on the ground, in the sea, and in the air, to the end that efforts might be made to initiate talks.

Many others in the Senate and elsewhere have offered suggestions. There has been no lack of proposals. Many have been pursued through the channels of traditional diplomacy. The distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, has been a central figure in these secret diplomatic efforts to bring about peace. In spite of his great efforts and those of other diplomats and men of good will, peace is no closer.

This factor has led me to question an apparent reluctance to bring into play the more formal machinery of the Charter of the United Nations in an effort to break down the barriers to peace. I question this reluctance again today. The fact is that the U. N., to date, has not even taken official cognizance of the existence of a conflict in Viet Nam. That sort of ostrich-approach seems to me to court for the organization irrelevancy at best and eventual disaster at worst.

I do not believe anyone has a right to expect, with respect to Viet Nam, a miracle of peace from the U. N. I do believe, however, that the peoples of the world have a right to expect some public indication of concern of member nations, as to the dangers of this conflagration. There is a right to expect, at least, some effort to use the machinery of the Charter to dampen down the flames in Viet Nam before the war goes entirely out of control.

There are, of course, great difficulties involved in the assumption of an active role by the U.N. with respect to Viet Nam. Two of the principal parties concerned—North Viet Nam and Communist China—for example, are not members of the United Nations. That does not foreclose, however, a contribution from the U.N. It has seemed to me entirely appropriate that at the very least, the U.N. should open its forum to discussion of the problem by all involved directly or indirectly in Viet Nam—members and nonmembers alike. Such a procedure is proper; it is precedented; it is not subject to veto. There is no reason, so far as I can see, why the Security Council cannot offer to bring together not only the member states who are most intimately concerned in the situation—that is, the United States and the Soviet Union—but also the non-members, that is, Communist China, North Viet Nam, the government of South Viet Nam and any other group of relevance to a peaceful settlement. I should think, too, that the Security Council might also consider requesting the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. All of the belligerents have made reference, from time to time, to these Accords as the basis for a peaceful settlement. Certainly, it is appropriate to try to see through the impartial and judicious eyes of the Court what the applicability of these agreements may entail in present circumstances.

Let me make clear that I suggest the pursuit of peace through the U.N. Security Council not in lieu of private or secret diplomacy, not in lieu of a revival of the Geneva Conference. Rather, I suggest it as a supplement or precipitant of these approaches or any other which may hold some promise of a solution.

As I have noted, the effort has been made since the outset to find a pathway to peace through secret and traditional diplomacy and it has been unsuccessful. Therefore, I think there is everything to be gained and nothing to be lost at this time by a public search before the U.N. for the gaps between the positions of the belligerents and the means by which they may be bridged.

There is no assurance that a resort to the procedural machinery of the United Nations will produce any more significant results than those yielded by secret and traditional diplomacy. That will not be known, however, unless and until the approach is tried.

Insofar as this nation is concerned, I cannot see that we violate our own interests or the interests of any other nation by a vigorous pursuit of peace at the U.N. Based on the Korean precedents, our government can very properly urge upon the Security Council a vote on these two specific resolutions pertaining to Viet Nam:

One, that the Secretary General be instructed to invite governments and groups directly and indirectly involved in the Vietnamese conflict, including China and North Viet Nam, to participate before the Council in an open and unlimited discussion of the conflict;

Two, that the Security Council request the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the current applicability of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the obligations which these agreements may place on those directly or indirectly involved in the Vietnamese conflict.

In closing, may I emphasize that the responsibility for the conduct of our nation's foreign affairs is vested in the President of the United States. Whether we agree with him or disagree, whether he pleases or displeases us, will not lighten one iota the onerous burdens which rest on his shoulders as a result of the Vietnamese conflict. The President may look for advice to his aides in the Executive Branch. He may look to the Senate and to the people of this nation. Whether or not advice is forthcoming, whether or not there is consent to his course, the President still must decide what he believes to be in the best interests of the United States. That is his responsibility. He cannot share it—he can only assume it, on behalf of all of us.

The President needs and should have our understanding, our help and prayers, and the support which can be given to him in good conscience. It ought to be borne in mind at all times that whatever contribution this nation can make to a peaceful settlement in Viet Nam, that contribution can only be made and will be made on behalf of all of us, in the end, by the President of the United States.

EXHIBIT 4

FACE THE NATION

(As broadcast over the CBS Television Network and the CBS Radio Network, May 7, 1967)

Guest: The Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

News Correspondents: Martin Agronsky, CBS News; Anne Weill-Tuckerman, agence France-Presse; Richard C. Hottelet, CBS News.

Director: Robert Vitarelli.

Producers: Ellen Wadley and Prentiss Childs.

(NOTE.—Transcripts of this broadcast will be distributed in New York where the program originates and in Washington.)

Mr. AGRONSKY. Mr. Ambassador, a former highly-placed advisor in both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Mr. Richard Goodwin said last night the United States has abandoned the policy of seeking a peaceful solution in Vietnam, and looks now for a military solution, which calls for an unconditional surrender. What is your answer to that, sir?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, Martin, I do not agree with that statement, and I do not think it is well founded, although I understand and appreciate the motives of Mr. Goodwin, a very nice person, in raising the question. And, it is important that we lay that to rest. The United States position with respect to a solution in Vietnam remains what it has been consistently since the President's speech at Johns Hopkins in April, 1965. We seek a political solution, not a military solution to this conflict. By the same token, we reject the notion that North Vietnam and its allies should have the right to impose a military solution on the situation. We do not seek the unconditional surrender of our adversaries and that, I repeat, is a constant policy, it has not changed, it remains the dominating impulse of the United States in this situation.

ANNOUNCER. From CBS New York, in color, Face the Nation, a spontaneous and unrehearsed news interview with United States Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg. Ambassador Goldberg will be questioned by CBS News United Nations Corre-

spondent Richard C. Hottelet, Anne Weill-Tuckerman, of Agence France-Presse. To lead the questioning, here is CBS News Correspondent, Martin Agronsky.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Mr. Ambassador, there will be considerable relief in the country that you say we are dedicated still to a peaceful solution. Nevertheless, all the signs seem to be, aside from Mr. Goodwin's remarks that General Westmoreland came here to seek extra troops, that he will get them, that we are enroute to a policy of escalation of this war and there is certainly no sign of any escalation of our diplomatic efforts to seek peace.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, Martin, I think that diplomatic efforts cannot always be public. I will say to you, and I will say to the American people, that our diplomatic efforts are unremitting and are pursued with the same vigor that the war is being pursued. We are in a great conflict. We cannot terminate the conflict by ourselves. Any conflict requires agreement on both parts to terminate the conflict. But, we seek a peaceful solution, not peace at any price, but an honorable solution through diplomatic resources and every day at the UN, as my colleagues here and at the UN know, Mr. Hottelet, Miss Tuckerman, we pursue this, we make probes. I do not recall a single day in the two years almost that I have been at the UN where we have not had conversations on that subject. Those conversations still continue here at UN New York, and I think they continue in many capitals in the world where we have representation, and our adversaries have representation.

Miss WEILL-TUCKERMAN. Mr. Ambassador, I understand that you are planning to go to Geneva during the Pacem in Terris Conference at the end of this month. U Thant, the Secretary-General of the UN, will be there and also, I believe, the representatives of Hanoi and maybe the FLN, the Viet Cong. Now, is that so, do you have such a plan, and if you do, do you intend to seek contact with the Hanoi and FLN people?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, Anne, part of the difficulty here is that if you say something like this you raise false hopes. When I said we pursue the path of peaceful settlement, I would not want to create any false impression that a settlement is in the offing. I have been invited to go to Geneva. I have said, as I have said to many groups in this country and away from this country, that I shall be very glad to go and state our position, if it is at all possible, consistent with the work we have to do in New York. You know we have some unfinished business in New York, we are not finished with this special session. I am not aware that our adversaries have agreed to be there, and I would not like to create the impression that something fresh is in the works. I shall, I hope, be there. I have some other business in Europe. I shall state the position of the United States, but the important thing is this—we are not lacking in points of contact, if there is a mutual willingness to conduct a dialogue which I regard to be indispensable to settle this conflict. No conflict can be settled, whether it is domestic, as I know from my experience, or international, without a dialogue, without a discussion, without a willingness on both parts to exchange points of view.

Mr. HOTTELET. Mr. Ambassador, there is a dialogue in the United States right now over the meaning of this war, its nature and its end, and it has been said that the dissent which has been voiced, sometimes very loudly and forcefully, is a complicating factor which puts off an end, an honorable end to the war. Do you feel that some limits of responsibility, as some people advocate, should be set to this dissent?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. This is, Dick, an old problem about dissent. My own feeling is very simple. I stated it as a Justice of the Supreme Court. I have not changed my mind because I took off the robe. Dissent is an important part of the American system. I do not even agree with the statements that have been made, and I express a personal point of view, that dissent "must be responsible." Obviously, all of us would like dissent to be responsible, but who is to define "responsible?" It is out of the exchange of views that we can arrive at a right decision. The Government, and I speak for the Government at the UN, believes that it has made the right decisions; but a democracy entails the right of anybody to dissent, whether it is responsible or not. Now, that does not mean that any citizen has a right to engage in illegal activity. That is a different matter. What is contrary to law is not the type of dissent contemplated by the First Amendment. The First Amendment contemplates free discussion. It is only by free discussion we can arrive at correct decisions, and I don't think that is a sign of weakness, I think it is a sign of strength and it is really what we are fighting about in Vietnam, that the people should have a right to express themselves, and a right to arrive at their own decisions, free from force, free from violence, by the crucible of free discussion.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Mr. Ambassador——

Mr. HOTTELET. Congressmen Hébert, of Louisiana on Friday suggested that the First Amendment be set aside, you wouldn't agree?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. No, I don't agree with that. I am not aware of that statement and I don't like to quarrel with Congressmen, it's not diplomatic for me to do so. But, the Supreme Court of the United States, talking about the Civil War and at a time of our greatest travail, said in Ex Parte Milliken, and it was directed at Abraham Lincoln, our great President, "The Constitution of the United States holds under the mantle of its protection all citizens in time of war as well as in time of peace. It is not written to be relinquished because we are in a war and in a period of grave conflict." I believe profoundly in that.

Mr. AGRONSKY. You would not under any circumstances then equate dissent with a lack of patriotism?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Oh, no. That is a danger we must obviously avoid. We went through a grueling experience during the McCarthy period. I would regard it to be a horrendous day for our country if, because of the grave conflict we are in, that there should be any resurrection of McCarthyism in this country. Dissent is not to be equated with disloyalty. There are many people who sincerely question our motives and policies. Now, then, we can defend them. Government has the right of free speech, too. This program is an illustration of this. I don't find any difficulty in having invitations to present the Government point of view, the Administration point of view to the American people. My difficulty is getting too many invitations. So the Government, we must recognize that government does have the right of free speech just as a citizen does, but that is part of the American scheme.

Miss WEILL-TUCKERMAN. Mr. Ambassador, you——

Mr. AGRONSKY. Go ahead, Miss Tuckerman.

Miss WEILL-TUCKERMAN. You have said earlier that the United States does not seek unconditional surrender of the adversary. Yet, American officials say constantly that the U.S. will continue fighting until the aggression is stopped. Then they say we want to negotiate. Well, what is there to negotiate about, if this is the position of the United States?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, Anne, there is a great deal to negotiate about. First of all, the war has to continue until there is a settlement of the war, and the fact that the war goes on does not mean that the goal of the war is unconditional surrender. There have been wars when that has been the goal. In World War II, the defined goal of the Allies was the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan. That is not the goal of this conflict. Quite the contrary. As you remember, I stated in September, before the General Assembly, what are the goals of the United States, and they reflected what the President said at Baltimore, and they are still the goals. We do not seek unconditional surrender of North Vietnam. We do not seek that they should change their system. We are ready to negotiate a solution of the conflict. We do not seek to impose a policy of non-alignment—of alignment on the Government of South Vietnam. We are ready that they should be nonaligned, if that is their desire. Our objective is a simple one. We seek for them, the people of the South, the right to determine their own destiny, free from force and free from coercion.

Now, those are continuing goals. They are far different from a system where you say the way to settle this war is for you to march up and surrender to the American Forces. I see a great difference in that. But we cannot settle the war by ourselves. Two parties must settle the war.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Mr. Ambassador, there is great concern in the country, and throughout the world, at the inability of this Administration to settle the war, and Senator Aiken, of Vermont, after the issuance of that White Paper by the Senate Republican Policy Committee, said he didn't feel this Administration could settle the war, that it would take a Republican Administration.

I don't think Aiken was really speaking only in political terms. He really feels that this Administration has arrived at a point of impotence in trying to settle this war. Would you agree; of course you won't?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, first of all, I ought to confess some prejudices in the matter. I am a great admirer of Senator Aiken. I regard him to be one of the very great Senators in the United States Senate.

Secondly, when I took my seat on the Supreme Court, I got out of politics and, despite what you may read about in the press and so on, I am not going to re-enter the field of politics.

Thirdly, I regard this post of mine to be completely to be non-political. I speak for all of the American people, I speak for the Government, but I speak for all of the American people.

So that I do not enter, and would not enter, into this question of Republican or Democratic positions. I don't think Senator Aiken speaks politically, I hasten to add.

Now, every Administration, Republican or Democratic, representing the American people, will have to try to find an honorable solution to this war.

I believe that all of our people, and everybody in all of our political parties, regardless of their approach to the problem, want an honorable settlement, and the question is: how do you find it?

I think our adversaries are pretty realistic. I think that they know that the American people will support their Government in the attempt to find an honorable solution to the war, and if they cannot find an honorable solution, will support their Government in the pursuit of the war, and therefore this Government, this Administration, must try to find a solution, and it has the same problem that any administration will find, the other side must join it in its objective, and that has been part of the difficulty. We cannot get a dialogue going, many attempts have been made to try and get a dialogue going that will bring about a concrete discussion—how is this war to be brought to an honorable end? Thus far we haven't been successful, but we have to persevere.

Mr. HOTTELET. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to harken back to an earlier point in your career. You know as much about labor relations as anyone in the United States.

There is a great deal of controversy, too, and a great clash of interest between labor and management, in which the Government is having to intrude more than it has ever done.

Do you think that, looking over the field with the collapse of a newspaper in New York, largely because of union pressure; with the automobile industry facing very serious contractual negotiations with the matter of the railroad strike; do you think that the time is right for a whole new look at the institution of collective bargaining:

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, Dick, I am an ex-expert in the subject, if I ever was an expert. I constantly must seek new looks, but I doubt very much whether there are any magic solutions about major conflicts, just as I doubt that whether by the wave of a wand, which we would all like to find, a magic wand, we can get this conflict in Vietnam over.

In our domestic area we have a great problem. We would like labor conflicts to subside. We would like them to be all solved, but would also like to preserve our freedom. Now, all of the solutions to the grave labor conflicts involve trying to find a way to solve the problems and maintain freedom. This is not easy to do, whether it is newspapers in New York; whether it is the railroads, so I suggest that we don't do badly in our domestic scene, by and large, we get together, settle conflict, as you know, since you are also involved recently, that was settled. We had some problems on the television industry. I think that the railroad conflict will be settled. I believe it ought to be.

I wish, I wish in the international scene that we were as successful as we are in the domestic scene, when we have a grave conflict.

It is much—I can testify by personal experience now, in two years, it is much more difficult to settle basic conflicts internationally than domestically for a very simple reason—domestically, whatever our differences, we all serve the same goals and believe in them; internationally, we have wide divergencies of goals, objectives, methods, and that presents us with a great problem.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Mr. Ambassador, let's return you to the area of your competence in the United Nations. Why don't we use the UN to seek peace in Vietnam?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, Martin, we have tried; I believe, and one of the reasons I accepted my present post, is I believe strongly that the UN, after all, we are the principal architects of the UN, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were the architects, I believe the UN must play a role in preserving peace and security in the world.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Why don't we use it for that purpose?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Now, we have tried. we brought the—the first effort I made when I came down here was to try to involve the UN in finding a way to a peaceful settlement. As a matter of fact, it has been forgotten in all of the historical recitations. Quite early after I came down, in August of 1965, I brought a letter from the President encouraging the Secretary General to renew his activity in this area. He had made prior efforts that were unsuccessful. I don't want to go into the details of that. It has never been published, but I would like to report that in August, 1965, an effort was made by the Secretary General, we were cooperative, the adversaries were not.

Now, after that, we brought the matter officially to the UN in late January, 1966, and we met opposition to that. We met it by the Soviet Union, we met it by France, and we had a debate, we inscribed it on the agenda, we could not pursue it because implicit was a veto threat that if we did, the effort of the UN would be vetoed.

Just the other day, I said at the General Assembly that if the Soviet Union would withdraw its objection, we could go to the Security Council tomorrow and take up what the UN might do to bring about peace.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Did you say that to the Soviet representative?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Yes, I did.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Well, what did he say?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, he said the UN hasn't got competence to deal with this subject. I don't agree with him.

Miss WEILL-TUCKERMAN. Mr. Ambassador, when you brought the question to the Security Council in January, '66, the same day, simultaneously came the announcement of the resumption of the bombing. This, of course, created a certain type of impression that maybe was not too favorable for a dispute.

In the same way you have, I believe, recently, you, yourself accepted the latest plan of the Secretary General U Thant which calls for a cease-fire, stand-still truce, and General Westmoreland a few weeks later said that a cease-fire was not in the interest of the United States. Now, how do you resolve these contradictions and the credibility gap that has developed at the UN and anywhere else?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, Anne, you have asked about five questions so I will try to answer them in sequence. First, when we came in January, 1966, that was not my first effort to bring it to the UN. I was perfectly willing, on behalf of the United States, to bring it in August, 1965, when that situation did not exist. I was quite ready to bring it during the bombing pause of December-January, December, 1965, January, 1966. Why did I not do so at that time?

Because everybody that I consulted down here said—now, this is not a good time to bring it to the UN because there is underway a diplomatic effort. This might interfere with the effort. I consulted very broadly, and finally, when we brought it at the time we did, we had exhausted the possibility of arriving at a diplomatic solution during the bombing pause, and I recommended to the President, let us bring it, because it seems to me that everybody says, no good time exists for bringing it. Now, about a cease-fire and the Secretary General's suggestion. The official response of the United States, the official—now, we are not going to—we talk about free speech, we are not going to prevent officials of the American Government, we are not a monolithic government, and if the President stopped General Westmoreland from expressing his sincere convictions, there would be a great outcry in the press and on television that we are gagging the General. The official position of the United States was given in an official letter which I wrote and delivered to the Secretary General, with the approval of the Government at the highest levels, in which we said:

1. You propose a cease-fire, we are agreeable. All we suggest, and I think quite rightly, is that we have some conversations because a cease-fire must be an effective cease-fire, not that that means that every little bit of shooting will stop, but you have to arrange when will it take effect; how will armies disengage. We have practical things to do.

Second, so that remains the position. We are for a mutual cease-fire, and we are ready today to talk about the modalities of such a cease-fire. That is the position of the United States Government.

Now, there are difficulties, as General Westmoreland, he is a soldier, properly pointed out. But the official position of the United States Government is, we are for a cease-fire.

Mr. AGRONSKY. How do you explain the refusal of the Soviet Union to permit the discussion of the Vietnam problem in the United Nations?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, that is a very troublesome thing. I wish the Soviet Union would join the United States in putting its full force behind working out an honorable solution to Vietnam. I think it is in their interest, I think it is in our interest. We are the two largest world powers. The greater the power, the greater the responsibility to try to work out world peace and world security.

Now, how do you explain their attitude? They say they want a peace, we say we want peace; they say they want the Geneva Accords implemented, we say we want the Geneva Accords implemented. Then we fall apart.

We fall apart because we say anybody, you, should do something about it. You are a co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, if you don't agree that the UN is the place, join Prime Minister Wilson, reconvene the Conference, we will be there. We are ready to do it, we are ready to say that we ought to reaffirm the Geneva Accords.

Mr. AGRONSKY. How do they answer that?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. I think their answer is this, and it is not a satisfactory answer by our likes. They say that we support the program of Hanoi in this matter. Hanoi has said we do not recognize the competence of the UN, we do not believe it is necessary to go to Geneva. All that is necessary to do is for the Americans to get out and there will be peace in that part of the world.

Now, that is not so.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Why do we keep saying to ourselves and indicating, as you do, and as all American officials do, that the Russians want peace in Vietnam? Yet, the Russians have continually stated that they will supply Hanoi with all of the help that they possibly can.

There is a fundamental contradiction here. How do you explain that?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Martin, there is a contradiction and we cannot resolve that contradiction. And, I do not say that we support what they do, quite the contrary. I would hope that the Soviets would resolve this contradiction in their own policy because I don't believe that that policy is conductive to peace. I would hope that they would really come to terms and use their influence as they did in Laos in 1962, to bring about a resolution of that particular problem that I know about, because I was in President Kennedy's Cabinet, which was not satisfactorily resolved because it has not been honored by the Pathet Lao and the Communists, but at least we brought about a solution.

I would hope they would do the same.

On the other hand, because we cannot persuade them to do the same, that does not mean we should not try in other areas to try to bring about an accommodation of point of views.

As a matter of fact, every time we bring about an accommodation of point of views in other areas, space, counsular treaty, nuclear nonproliferation, we illustrate the inconsistency of their policy because here we are pursuing the paths of getting along, trying to minimize the area of conflict and we have an area where the conflict exists. We think they are inconsistent not the United States——

Mr. HOTTELET. But this approach toward agreement seems to have ground to a stop now, because the negotiations on the anti-ballistic missiles system, the negotiations on the Treaty to Ban the Spread of Nuclear Weapons seem to be at least in trouble, if not broken down altogether.

Ambassadar GOLDBERG. No, Dick, I don't quite agree with that. It is not easy to find accommodation, as I discovered when I was in charge of our team that negotiated the Space Treaty.

On the other hand, we made some significant steps this year. We have the air agreement, and while we have some technical problems, I think we will resolve them. We did agree upon the Space Treaty. We did agree upon the Consular Treaty.

Now, we have ratified them, by the way, and I am very proud of our country, that we were among the first. Now we expect and anticipate that the Soviet Union will ratify them.

It is now up to them.

Now, on nuclear proliferation, we are in conversations and we have some problems with our own allies, we are trying to resolve them. I notice Mr. Foster has gone to Tokyo. It is natural that we should have to explain and make sure that all points of view are presented, so I don't agree that they have come to an end.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Well, we have run out of time, unfortunately, Mr. Ambassador. I wish you could have concluded by telling us of a new specific peace bid in which you are operating, but apparently, as you say, it's always going on. Thank you very much for being here to Face the Nation.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Thank you, Martin.

ANNOUNCER. Today, on Face the Nation, United States Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg was interviewed by CBS News United Nations Correspondent Richard C. Hottelet, Anne Weill-Tuckerman of Agence France-Presse, CBS News Correspondent Martin Agronsky led the questioning. Next week, another prominent figure in the news will Face the Nation.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I join with the distinguished majority leader, the senior Senator from Montana, in his recommendation.

I agree with him that the hour is growing late. During these last 2 or 3 weeks, particularly since General Westmoreland was here, I feel that there has been an increase in tension not only in this country, but also between this country and Russia. We have noted the incidents that occurred in the Sea of Japan. They do not seem to be so important in and of themselves. However, I think they are symptomatic of a nervousness which could lead to world war III.

I think the mention in the newspapers recently of the President's own thought almost a year ago about the possibility of this war leading to world war III is very ominous. I think that the situation certainly warrants the recommendation that has been made by the Senator from Montana.

I join with him in that recommendation. I also take this opportunity to pay my respects to the Senator from Oregon who, I believe, was the first Member of the Senate, that I can recall, who so strongly recommended early in the conflict that it be taken to the United Nations.

I think it is quite correct that we recognize his foresight in that connection. I wish I could think of something that could give impetus to this idea.

I am afraid I do not see much inclination on the part of the Executive to move in this direction, however. There seems to have developed a feeling that nothing can be done either in or out of the United Nations and that we are now following an all-out military course.

I hope that feeling is not so and that the recommendations of the Senator from Montana will be taken seriously.

I congratulate him for his very effective statement.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. I hope that his foreboding is not correct, because the time is getting pretty short.

I hope that we will refer this matter to the U.N., an organization which, in my opinion, has not met its responsibility from the very beginning of this conflict, and that if the United Nations does face up to this matter and a call is issued to the Vietcong, the North Vietnamese, the Chinese, and others to come to the conference table, that we will be prepared to accept the verdict of the United Nations in that instance, whatever it may be.

Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, we have this afternoon had two proposals made to the Senate, each hopefully looking either to the deescalation or the ending of the war in Southeast Asia.

The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] recommended deescalating the war without in any way abdicating any responsibility that we might have in South Vietnam.

The Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], recommended that we make an effort to reach some solution through the United Nations.

These two proposals are not incompatible. They can both be tried out at the same time, and I hope that they will be.

The original purpose of the United Nations, one of the main purposes of the United Nations, was to find a way in which to settle dissention among the nations without resorting to war.

It has been successful in a small way, but only where the two parties to the controversy have both been looking for a way out.

It so happens that a long time ago, well over a year ago, our Ambassador to the United Nations submitted a proposal to the Security Council for intervening in or at least taking notice of the situation in South Vietnam. As yet, nothing has been done.

I believe the United Nations is in a position where it must—as we say in Yankee Land—"cut bait or fish" if it is going to be an effective organization. If it proves that it cannot be an effective and efficient organization, it can at least make an effort.

The United States cannot be the policeman for the whole world, and the trouble we are having in one very small part of that world indicates that we could not possibly police the entire world even if we attempted to do so.

I hope that the President will instruct Ambassador Goldberg to insist that the Security Council take some action. If the Security Council refuses to take any action, we will then know who wants war and who does not want war in this world of ours.

If any of the five major nations, the five nations holding veto power on the Security Council, undertake to veto any effort at all, then they must take the responsibility for continuing an escalation of the war in the world. It is hard to believe that they will do that, but it is possible.

I am not sure that any of the plans or proposals submitted to us today will work, but we would certainly be negligent if we did not try them. And if the Security Council and the United Nations do undertake to restore peace in the world, which was the original purpose of the organization—to maintain peace in the world—and then come forward with a solution, even though it is not 100 percent what the United States wants, I hope that the President will see fit to accept it.

It is high time now that we find out who really is promoting this war in Southeast Asia and who really wants to maintain peace in the world.

I believe that other countries besides the United States will be in a position where the responsibility will rest upon their shoulders if we do not achieve any favorable result at all in the way of bringing the world to peace again. I hope that President Johnson will not hesitate to direct Ambassador Goldberg to insist upon action by the United Nations so that we may know once and for all who the real promoters of the war in the world are.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Vermont.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I associate myself with the views of the majority leader, the distinguished Senator from Montana. I congratulate him on his speech.

The basic reef upon which negotiations between us, the NLF and the North Vietnamese founder is that our adveraries do not believe that we will accept a government that represents all the various factions of that unhappy country, South Vietnam.

I think if the suggestions made today were presented to a United Nations or Security Council conference—or to any other conference—within the next few weeks and we agreed to accept the recommendations coming from it, a great deal could thus be done to clear the air.

I believe the Senator from Montana has put his finger on the sticking point when he said that he hoped we would accept with good grace whatever the results of the conference were.

We did not accept with grood grace the results of the Geneva Conference. We have usually been opposed to going to a conference and agreeing to accept the result. I think we will have to publicly agree to accept the results before going into a conference. I hope that we will do so.

I thank the distinguished Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Kansas.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, it seems to me that Monday, May 15, may be a memorable day in our Vietnam war.

Two outstanding addresses have been delivered in the Senate, one by the distinguished majority leader, the other by the able Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER], in regard to the concern of citizens about our situation in Vietnam. I believe that the expressions in the Senate today speak of the unrest in the Nation. It is prevalent everywhere one goes. I sincerely hope that the administration

will give every consideration to the messages that have been given in the Senate this afternoon.

I notice that several members of the Committee on Foreign Relations are in the Chamber. We all remember the extended and strenuous efforts on the part of the distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], in our executive sessions, in regard to presenting this matter to the United Nations. I do not believe I speak out of turn when I mention that we have had Secretary Rusk before us on several occasions and have instructed him to go to the United Nations and urge that they take action.

We have had Ambassador Goldberg before our committee and have expressed to him the importance of this situation being taken over by the United Nations.

So I say today that this war will be settled at a conference table, and I sincerely hope that it will be settled soon. The messages delivered in the Senate today, which speak the minds and the feelings of Members of this great body, should reach not only our Nation's Capital, and the President's office itself, but the United Nations and other countries as well.

I sincerely hope that every consideration will be given to these outstanding and able messages by Senators who are familiar with and have studied the international problem that has been expressed in the Senate this afternoon.

I commend the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Kansas for his kind remarks.

I did not note that those who are on the floor this afternoon all happen to be members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, in some form or other.

I yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the significance of the speech just delivered by the majority leader is very great. The significance is so great that I believe I violate no privilege by making the prediction that we will be coming back to this speech in the months ahead. I believe the speech outlines one of our last best hopes for trying to resolve the war in Vietnam on an honorable basis. It offers that hope to the world without leading to a dangerous escalation that may involve many of the countries with whom we are now pleading for diplomatic assistance into World War III. The Mansfield speech really pleads for resolving the war through existing peace keeping procedures of international law.

I am in the presence of the majority leader, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Senator from Vermont, who have been my leaders and my teachers in many aspects of this troubled foreign policy area. I believe the Mansfield report of the fall of 1965, in which the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] and the others of that commission joined, paved the way for the discussion that we are engaged in this afternoon.

The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] time and time again, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, has pleaded with and has sought to involve the State Department in rational discussion of the desirability of making use of existing peacekeeping procedures, of the United Nations charter and of other treaties under which we are committed.

I believe the Senator from Montana this afternoon has well served the best interests of our country in this particular hour, in making a plea again that our Government should seek official resort to the terms and articles of the United Nations. But that is not the only recourse open to our Government.

Comments have been made concerning my long interest in this matter. I appreciate the references which have been made to my consistent plans for the last 3 or more years that the administration should insist that the United Nations should take jurisdiction over the threat to the peace of the world which has developed in Southast Asia. The majority leader, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Vermont, have been very kind to allude to my record in this request and I thank them very much. The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] and I have had discussions about the desirability of having the United Nations intervene in this war by exercising its rightful jurisdiction under the charter. More than 2 years ago, at the President's request, I prepared two legal memoranda for him on the subject of our dealing with the international law aspects of this problem through the United Nations Charter. The second memorandum set forth a series of specific resolutions that the President had asked me to draft, which would conform to the existing peacekeeping procedures of the charter.

The majority leader knows that of recent date those memoranda again were discussed. They became of current importance and were the subject of some consideration in an exchange of views with some officials within the administration.

I wish to stress that many people who are now saying that the United Nations cannot be of help and that the United Nations is useless have not taken the time to study what the obligations of the members of the United Nations really are under the charter.

One of the proposals I have urged, and urge again this afternoon—the only one I can speek about publicly, because it is the only one that has become public from other sources—is that some consideration be given by the Security Council to referring the whole matter to the General Assembly, Yes, I would add that consideration should be given by the Security Council to even recommending and expanding of the membership of the Geneva Conference as a suitable format for trying to aid the combatants to reach an honorable negotiated settlement. Such a format would not necessarily exclude the Security Council from a participating party to the negotiations.

One of the arguments you hear is that China, North Vietnam, and the Vietcong do not belong to the United Nations. Of course, the commitment under the United Nations is not that peace will be enforced only between members. The United Nations Charter places the obligation upon the members signatory thereto to enforce the peace, to prevent a threat to the peace against any country in the world or any combination of countries in the world—members or nonmembers—that threatens peace. That just happens to be the international law commitment of the signatories to the United Nations Charter.

I believe the Senator from Vermont was correct when, a few moments ago, he pointed out what the primary purpose of the charter is. The United Nations was formed to enforce the peace, to prevent a threat to the peace, Any other program of the United Nations that has subsequently developed is ancillary to that primary obligation. If the signatories are not willing to move to enforce the peace, then the United Nations Charter is truly a scrap of paper. If signatories to a treaty are not willing to carry out their obligations under the treaty, they have turned it into a scrap of paper.

Therefore, the possibilities of a settlement of this war through recourse to these peacekeeping procedures, which now have been given the standing of international law obligations by the signatories to the charter, are manifold.

The general tendency in the Senate is to assume that the Security Council will have to enforce the peace and negotiate a settlement if the Security Council decides to take jurisdiction. That does not follow at all. The Security Council has the jurisdiction under the charter to exercise such an authority if it should decide to so act.

However, the Security Council has wide latitude in working out procedural solutions for the handling of the war. It may decide to call upon the General Assembly to cooperate with the Security Council by making use of the procedures of the General Assembly, as well as the Security Council. Furthermore, I would like to suggest that the Security Council give very careful consideration to the possibility of expanding the membership of the Geneva Conference. An enlarged Geneva Conference might prove to be a very effective international instrumentality for helping reach an honorable settlement of the war in Vietnam.

I said on the floor of the Senate the other day that I think it is too bad we ever walked out on the Geneva Conference. One of the greatest mistakes ever made in our time in American foreign policy was our failure to sign the 1954 Geneva Treaty. If we had stayed in Geneva as a participating member, we might have ended up using our good offices in bringing about many changes in the treaty including the size of the International Commission. Instead of the treaty provision calling for a Commission composed of three members we might have obtained agreement for five to seven members, with the United States serving on it. What a difference it would have made in the implementing of the Geneva Conference Treaty if the United States had been a participating member, using its great influence to help direct and police the administration of the treaty itself. I think the war itself might

very well have been averted if the United States had continued to serve as a voting member of the Geneva Conference in 1954.

It is not too late to try to reestablish the Geneva Conference and expand its membership. To our everlasting credit, although it took us a long time to come to this point, we now support reconvening the Geneva Conference. The administration reached that point some 15 months after it was proposed by the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] and me. For that proposal, then we were attacked by some administration officials, and by the press of this country with the charge that we were advocating negotiations with Communist nations. Our reply was, "That is 100 percent correct. We better get on with negotiating with the Communists, because they are an ugly reality which cannot be bombed out of existence. We are going to have to negotiate a peaceful settlement with them. We must let that time of history pass until the peoples of Communist countries become more enlightened and are allowed to develop a better standard of living. When this is achieved they will have economic freedom. When they enjoy, ultimately, a better standard of living and economic freedom, in the course of history they will then develop by self-determination their political freedom. But that may be 50 to 100 years from now."

This is no overnight problem with an easy solution that confronts us here in the United States nor, for that matter, the rest of the people of the world. What I wish to emphasize is that we cannot impose either our will or our economic, political, social, cultural, or military systems on the people of Asia.

The trouble is that there are not many persons thinking about the world 50 to 100 years from now. Too many are thinking about the state of the world in the next few years. I fear what the state of the world will be if the warmaking policies of those advocating ever-increasing escalation of the war in Southeast Asia leads us into world war III.

Again I wish to say that the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] has performed a great service here today by urging that the Security Council proceed, formally and officially to, give consideration to what it can do to try to lead the combatants in the war in Vietnam to a peaceful solution.

The Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] pointed out that more than a year ago we filed a resolution with the Security Council. In connection with the filing of that resolution, the very day we filed it we proceeded to bomb North Vietnam. As a result, discussion in the cloakroom and in the corridors in the United Nations building in New York City was not at all about our filing a resolution suggesting that the Security Council consider discussing the war in Southeast Asia. Instead on that hateful day the discussion in the United Nations consisted of bitter criticism of the United States for proceeding to escalate bombing into North Vietnam the same day that we pretended to offer with our other hand an olive branch. That hurt us irrevocably. It is one of the great diplomatic mistakes our Government made within the United Nations.

But filing a resolution does not fulfill our obligation as a signatory to the charter.

There are some spokesmen for the administration who frequently say, or have said in the past that we have filed a resolution. Filing a resolution does not fulfill our commitment as a signatory to the charter. We filed a resolution but it was not in a form that required Security Council action. It was not in a form that required any action either by way of approval or veto by the Security Council. In effect it was an invitation on the part of the United States to have the Southeast Asian war discussed by the Security Council.

We should have filed a resolution calling upon the Security Council to take jurisdiction over the war. Then we should have insisted upon our right to have the resolution considered by the Security Council. Please note my use of the word "right." We have a right to have the Security Council vote for or veto our request that the United Nations enforce a peace in Vietnam. The Security Council can take whatever parliamentary action it wants. Some member could veto a resolution calling for peacekeeping action. That is what I want to find out. I want to find out what member of the Security Council or members of the Security Council would veto a proposal urged upon the Security Council by the United States to proceed to carry out the peacekeeping obligations of the charter. It is an obligation imposed upon every signatory thereto.

As I told the President on more than one occasion, and in the very recent past, "Mr. President, I want to put France and Russia on the spot. I want to find out if it is true, as has been suggested a good many times by some officials in advice to the President, that France or Russia, or both, would veto it." My answer to that advice is: Let us find out.

Let us show the world, as the Senator from Vermont said by clear implication a few moments ago, what nation or nations in the Security Council are unwilling to carry out their obligations under the charter. I think we would be surprised over the outcome if we insisted upon our right to have the Security Council vote up or down, yes or no, in respect to its obligations under the charter. The charter not only vests obligations in the Security Council, but also makes it the duty of the Security Council to carry them out if a nation proves that there is a threat to the peace that calls for the implementation of the charter.

That is the legal issue that we have not pressed. We have not insisted on getting a response on the issue from the Security Council. The official debate that would take place in the Security Council would be very salutary. Oh, I know that we have those in our country who have not been very enthusiastic about such a debate, because some of it would not be a pro-U.S. debate. There is no doubt that a debate before the Security Council would cause some members of the Security Council to discuss a bill of particulars in regard to the international law violations charged against the United States, time and time again, in respect to our conduct in Vietnam.

But let us get it behind us. We will have that debate eventually in some form, and we should have it in parliamentary form. But let me point out that it will not be only violations of the United States that will be discussed, because, let me say to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union also has been violating the United Nations Charter. Although it is one of the cochairmen of the Geneva accords, it has also been violating the Geneva accords. What are we afraid of? It would be an international debate about what happened factually in Southeast Asia. It would discuss the legal consequences of those happenings. Eventually the debate will come, and we should have it now before increasing thousands of human beings are killed as the result of a war that should be stopped now by the members of the United Nations.

I believe that the United Nations can stop it now. Of course, I know it can be pointed out that the Secretary General made statements, recently quoted in the press, even over the past weekend, in which he expressed great doubt that the United Nations can be of great help. However, he is not the United Nations. I share great regard for what this man of peace has been trying to do. However, on this point, I say respectfully, I believe he would be proved wrong if the members of the Security Council proceeded to carry out the terms of the Charter and their obligations relative thereto. I am also convinced that the great Secretary General would be the first to welcome it if the United Nations would only agree to act.

Mr. President, a debate in the Security Council would be most helpful to clear the international atmosphere in regard to the situation in Vietnam. As I have said to my President and to others in the executive branch, "If our resolution is vetoed in the Security Council, then move into the General Assembly." We would be surprised, in my judgment, by what a salutary effect it would have on this troubled world to have the matter thoroughly discussed in the General Assembly. If the Security Council refuses to act do not forget that under the charter, the General Assembly could take jurisdiction if it deemed it necessary, in order to stop a threat to the peace of the world. Every member of the General Assembly, as well as any other country not a member of the United Nations, has now come to have a great stake in the ending of the war. If the war continues, as was pointed out by the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] this afternoon, and other Senators who shared his viewpoint, and the war is escalated to the point that we will be involved in a war with China, then put it down on the calendar it will be only a matter of time before we will be involved in a war with Russia. That will mean, of course, the beginning of world war III.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. I would add two points. First, it is important that we try the United Nations to see whether it cannot be helpful in this case. Second, it is just as important, I think, at this time, that the United States should show it has confidence and belief in the United Nations organization.

We have been too much inclined to treat the United Nations as though it had no jurisdiction within the Western Hemisphere, in the first place, and no real jurisdiction or application if the United States should become involved in problems in some other part of the world.

Thus, it would be helpful in trying to resolve the problem of Vietnam if a device for building up the United Nations as a truly effective instrument for preserving and achieving peace could be accomplished.

Mr. MORSE. Those are two very important points, stated so much better than I could state them. I completely agree with the observations of the Senator from Minnesota.

I think it is important that we follow the framework of international law procedure which is available to us, so that there cannot be the slightest question of a doubt in the minds of anyone that the United States does seek a peaceful solution to the problem under the rules of international law.

Is it not going to be sad in the history of mankind if we fail to make use of the available procedures of the United Nations, the Geneva accords, or any other existing treaty which can be used to stop this war? If we in our time fail history, resulting in having a major holocaust break out, ending in the loss of millions of lives and great devastation throughout the world, our generation will be rightly condemned for the rest of human history. Then what is left of civilization will come forward once again with a proposal to set up an international body which will seek to prevent another world war.

Mr. President, how many times do we have to go through a repetition of failure on the part of the nations of the world, to substitute the rule of law for the jungle law of military might going back through the last half century? The talk about using these procedures of the rule of law brought forth a League of Nations. We know that the United Nations would have been better off had the United States not walked out on the League of Nations, as we walked out of the Geneva conference. We must not make that mistake again. We are, in effect, by not pressing our rights under the charter, walking out on the United Nations. I care not how many resolutions of mere form are filed; they are only resolutions of form, unless we press for the exercise of rights in the implementation of the resolutions which we file.

Thus, what concerns me is what people 100 years from now will say about our failure, if we miss this great, historic opportunity and duty which the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] this afternoon has pleaded we rise to and fulfill.

Let us face it: We are never going to settle this problem bilaterally. That is the position of the United States today. As to all the talk about winning and getting out: We can win a military victory, but we cannot get out. We would have to police the country with hundreds of thousands of American troops for decades to come. Eventually, we would be driven out.

What is the matter with us?

The American people constitute only 6 percent of the population of the world. Does the United States think it can maintain a permanent, dominating foothold anywhere on the land mass of Asia? If we think that, we should have our heads examined.

We should eliminate from our minds the inexcusable, nationalistic ego that has taken over the American people. The trouble with us, public opinionwise, is that we have developed an almost psychopathic ego.

The world, however, is not going to permit us to stay in Asia. If we were Asians, we would not permit the United States to stay there, either—I mean if we were Asians who had not become puppets of the United States.

So I think our problem is that we need to have others come in and be of assistance in order to resolve this difficulty. That is why Senators have heard me plead, as I have, now, for 3 years on the floor of the Senate, for a multilateral settlement of this dispute. We cannot accomplish it bilaterally because, as the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] stated earlier this afternoon—these are my words, but they are consistent with his meaning—we have not made unconditional offers of negotiation at any time in Southeast Asia. All of our offers of negotiation have not been unconditional at all. They have been conditional; we just have not expressed the conditions. The enemy in fact would have to come to the peace table pretty much on our terms, recognizing and agreeing that there shall be two Vietnams. Who is the United States to say that there shall be two Vietnams? Let the rest of the world decide that question by way of procedures that the United Nations could develop for a peace-treaty settlement of this dispute. I believe we would have to kill the Vietnamese and the Vietcong to the point of there being only a few left before they would ever agree to two Vietnams. Even then the resentment in the rest of Asia would be so tremendous that they would dig in against us for decades to come, out of sympathy both for the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong because of what the United States has been doing, until we were finally driven out.

The only hope for real peace in Vietnam is to have other nations take over the negotiating. The United States would be a party to it, but would not be in control. That is why I believe that if we would try to have the Security Council of the United Nations—I hope in conjunction with and expanded Geneva Conference—take over the settlement of the war in Vietnam, a settlement might be reached that both sides in the war could live with. It might be a settlement which would offer some hope for avoiding world war III, I do not think a bilateral settlement by the United States forced upon the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong would ever produce a peace. It would only produce a truce leading eventually to a massive war in Asia against the United States.

I am willing to let history read the prediction I make this afternoon: a bilateral settlement of the war forced upon North Vietnam and the Vietcong by the United States will eventually be one of the major causes of world war III.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, I wish to congratulate the Senator from Oregon for the speech he has just made. He has made a great contribution to the discussion.

He said a few minutes ago that one of the things that worry him is that 100 years from now people may say, "You did not take advantage of the opportunity to use the United Nations; you did not go to the limit in asserting our right to have the United Nations pass upon the dispute."

I agree to that. But what worries me even more is what is being said today, not what may be said in the future—what is said about the good faith and the validity of offers that we have said we have made, and statements we have made within the last few months, to reach a settlement promptly.

The committee had before it this morning our Ambassador to Poland, and we discussed at great length the episode that occurred last December. There was little I heard in that discussion that has not already been in the press. In fact, one of the bases for the discussion was an article by Mr. John Hightower in a very well-written article describing this matter. There was also a letter to the editor of the New York Times. In general, the essentials of the December episode were confirmed by the Ambassador.

I ask the Senator if he does not believe that today there are very few countries who are not our clients, who are not dependent upon us, who believe that in our efforts, going back to U Thant's effort back in 1964, I believe. This is the incident that was discussed by Eric Sevareid, and involved Adlai Stevenson. That and subsequent efforts, I ask the Senator, have they indicated really a willingness to negotiate a settlement except on the basis of North Vietnam's acceptance of our terms, which would be equivalent to a surrender?

Mr. MORSE. I am so glad the Senator from Arkansas has said what he has just now stated. It is beyond dispute that the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world disagree with and disapprove the course of action we have been following in Vietnam vis-a-vis our international law obligations. They are very much concerned with the fact that we have not lived up to those obligations. That is why we cannot point to a single major power in the world that has come to our side and participated with us in the prosecution of this war. Those countries know they could not reconcile their participation in that war with their international law obligations. They would

be joining the United States in its violation of its international law obligations.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In that connection, is the Senator familiar with a statement which has been made by the State Department, and documented by a little pamphlet, showing that 30 nations are behind us on Vietnam, using as evidence of their approval of our policy and their support of us, their contributions of medicines for the relief of sick people?

Mr. MORSE. Or an ambulance.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Or an ambulance, or aid to people who are injured in a flood of the Mekong River, and so on. Is the Senator familiar with that?

Mr. MORSE. Yes, I am familiar with it. I have characterized it as propaganda.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is misleading.

Mr. MORSE. Misleading propaganda, seeking to give the people of the world the impression that those countries support us.

I see the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] about to leave the Chamber. I wonder if the Senator will remain for just a moment.

Mr. AIKEN. I was about to leave.

Mr. MORSE. I wanted to ask a question on the point we have just brought up. I have not had a chance to be briefed by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee—who is Senator AIKEN—with respect to the recent meeting on United States-Canadian relations. Therefore, I do not know what happened. But I was told this afternoon that even in some of the parliamentary discussions in Ottawa our delegation found itself in discussions with the Canadians concerning the war. I was wondering if there was anything the Senator was free to say about the attitude of the Canadian delegates.

Mr. AIKEN. I do not think so. I think the Senator will find that there are differences of opinion in different countries, and that applies to the United States and Canada.

I think it is safe to say that most people in the world wish that the involvement in South Vietnam were not taking place. Most of the people in this country wish it were not taking place, too. But I do not know that I can say anything with regard to the attitude of the Canadian officials.

I did want to ask a question of the majority leader with regard to what I think has become a landmark proposal this afternoon, and that is if he has any idea how this proposal will fare with the administration. Will the President be willing to take this step toward the United Nations, which could conceivably lead to the reestablishment of world peace and put a very large roadblock in the way of a third world war?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senate will allow me, of course, I cannot speak for the President of the United States, but I can state this. When I delivered the Williams lecture at Johns Hopkins University on January 11, I received a call from the President and also from Ambassador Goldberg. The President said he was interested in the proposals which I had stated at Johns Hopkins University, to take the matter before the United Nations and place it before the Security Council, and would I get together and talk with Ambassador Goldberg and Secretary General U Thant and discuss the matter. I said, "Yes, sir."

A few days later I went to the United Nations. I did talk with Ambassador Goldberg and the Secretary General. At that time Ambassador Goldberg believed it might not be advisable to present it to the Security Council; that perhaps more could be done on the basis of contacts which had been opened. On that basis, it was not pushed.

In December of 1966, following that up, the President sent a letter to Ambassador Goldberg, to be delivered to Mr. U Thant, asking him to undertake a more thorough inquiry in the direction of reaching the negotiating table, to the end that an honorable truce could be achieved. Nothing came of it. Various factors intervened, some of which have been mentioned this afternoon.

I think the Secretary General, Mr. U Thant, has done all he could possibly do. I have nothing but commendation for his efforts. Maybe this approach will afford an opportunity to place the matter before the United Nations, because as the Senator has pointed out, in January 1965, the United States put a resolution before the Security Council—a resolution which is not subject to a veto. That resolution is still there.

So I would assume, on the basis of what has been done, that the President would not be unfavorably disposed or in opposition, but would look with favor on this proposal.

Mr. AIKEN. I personally do not believe the President would reject the proposal, which has been made in all sincerity, and which could conceivably let down the bars on the road to peace.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would agree with the Senator in his analysis.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Arkansas was speaking just before the Senator from Vermont made his statement.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The point I was about to make was that, based on what I believe were erroneous, misleading statements about the support of other countries, and based on reports indicating that we have made those efforts for negotiations, the people of this country believe that we have made good faith and open efforts at negotiations—by which I think ordinary people mean honorable, open negotiations—they believe we have made an open offer for a compromise settlement, as contrasted to a dictated settlement or a surrender.

I mention this partly by way of propounding my own explanation, but partly because this was brought out in the hearings of last year by members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, when we had as witnesses members of the administration, particularly General Taylor, and finally the Secretary of State, to develop the point as to what is meant by "settlement by negotiation," and whether it is equivalent to a surrender.

It seems to me that the conditions which have been set generally do amount to a surrender; that is, a total suspension of any aid on the part of Hanoi would be, it strikes me, the equivalent of a surrender.

Mr. MORSE. I think it would be a surrender; and also a surrender of their desire to have worked out a unified Vietnam.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. And we have been, I think, unwilling at any time to accept even the possibility of a unified Vietnam.

Mr. MORSE. That is correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator agree?

Mr. MORSE. Yes. We have been insisting that there be an independent South Vietnam, which, again, in my judgment, we have no right to insist upon under international law.

But I close, Mr. President, by again expressing my great appreciation to the Senator from Montana for his public discussion of this matter. We all know, Mr. President, that the background for the discussion does now show from the public remarks that the Senator has made today. This man, may I say, has been at work for a long time, trying to help bring about a peaceful solution of this problem within the framework of the existing peacekeeping procedures of international law.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PELL in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.